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Lemkin’s Situation 
TOWARD A RHETORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
GENOCIDE* 
Perry S. Bechky†  
“You must build the law!”–Raphael Lemkin.1 
“[L]aw is in the first place a language, a set of terms and texts and 
understandings that give to certain speakers a range of things to say 
to each other.”–James Boyd White.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Raphael Lemkin coined the word genocide during World 
War II. The word first appears in his 1944 treatise Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe.3 Chapter IX begins: “New conceptions require 
new terms.”4  
Lemkin regarded genocide5 as not merely a new word, 
but a new “conception,” a new way to understand the Nazi 
horrors then unfolding. A Jewish refugee from occupied 
Poland,6 Lemkin invented his word to help others see the 
 
 * © 2012 Perry S. Bechky. All rights reserved. 
 † Visiting Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law; JD, 
Columbia Law School; AB, Stanford University. For all their help, I thank Tom 
Antkowiak, Pat Brown, Mark Chinen, Sir Martin Gilbert, Steve Jacobs, Mark Janis, 
Lily Kahng, Won Kidane, Jack Kirkwood, Bob Menanteaux, Tom Morawetz, and Sirina 
Tsai, as well as my research assistants David Faber, James Kennedy, Brian Krupczak, 
Mallory Nelson, and Nicole Trask. All mistakes are my own. 
 1 A.M. Rosenthal, A Man Called Lemkin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1988, at A31 
(quoting Lemkin).  
 2 JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND 
POETICS OF THE LAW, at xi (1985). 
 3 See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF 
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS, at xi, 79 (1944) 
[hereinafter LEMKIN, AXIS RULE]. Some scholars prefer to date genocide to 1943, noting 
that Lemkin uses the word in the preface to Axis Rule, which is dated November 15, 
1943. Id. at xi, xv.  
 4 Id. at 79. 
 5 In this article, I italicize a word when talking about the word instead of using 
the word in the ordinary way. For example: Hitler committed genocide; Lemkin invented 
genocide. Here, as in the title itself, genocide is shorthand for “the word ‘genocide.’” 
 6 Although Lemkin describes himself as Polish, the village where he was 
raised “changed hands successive times” during his lifetime: “Bezwodne . . . had been 
under Russian czarist rule; it then shifted repeatedly between Germany and Belarus 
(except for a period during the inter-war when it formed part of the Second Polish 
Republic).” Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Human Rights and Genocide: The Work of Lauterpacht 
and Lemkin in Modern International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1163, 1166 (2009).  
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pattern of Nazi acts as he saw them—as “the crime of crimes.”7 
From understanding, Lemkin hoped, preventative action would 
follow. Specifically, Lemkin envisioned legal action against 
genocide: he wanted “all nations of the civilized world” to sign a 
treaty to bring about the laws and mechanisms needed to 
criminalize and prosecute genocide.8 
Lemkin pursued this ambition relentlessly. He doggedly 
sought meetings with prosecutors, drafters, negotiators, and 
decision-makers in Geneva, London, New York, Nuremberg, 
Paris, and Washington.9 He occupied vacant offices in the United 
Nations “like a hermit crab”;10 he walked the UN corridors for 
years, and, in order “[t]o see an ambassador, he would plan and 
plot for weeks and sit for days in reception rooms.”11 He gave 
speeches, wrote articles and letters, and drafted legal texts.  
And he proved remarkably successful. Nuremberg 
prosecutors mentioned genocide in the indictment and trial.12 
Just two years after Axis Rule, the newfound UN General 
Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 96(I), which 
condemns genocide as “a crime under international law” that 
“shocks the conscience of mankind.”13 Then, in just two more 
years, the General Assembly approved the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the 
Genocide Convention) as the UN’s first major action to protect 
human rights.14 The Genocide Convention testifies to the power 
of both ideas and unyielding determination. Lemkin’s efforts 
would prompt a UN official to observe, decades later, that 
 
 7 See Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, UN 
BULLETIN 70, 70 (Jan. 15, 1948) [hereinafter Lemkin, UN BULLETIN] (“[G]enocide must 
be treated as the most heinous of all crimes. It is the crime of crimes, one that not only 
shocks our conscience but affects deeply the best interests of mankind.”); Raphael 
Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man (unpublished draft), in PIONEERS OF GENOCIDE 
STUDIES 365, 383 (Samuel Totten & Steven Jacobs eds., 2002) [hereinafter Lemkin, 
Totally Unofficial Man]. 
 8 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiii, 93. 
 9 See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 27, 49-60 (2002).  
 10 Id. at 51. 
 11 Rosenthal, supra note 1. 
 12 See John Barrett, Raphael Lemkin and ‘Genocide’ at Nuremberg, 1945-
1946, in THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION SIXTY YEARS AFTER ITS ADOPTION 35, 45-47 
(Christoph Safferling & Eckart Conze eds., 2010). 
 13 The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. Doc. A/231 (Dec. 11, 1946) 
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 96 (I)]. 
 14 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/760 (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed the next day. See G.A. Res. 217 
(III) (A), U.N. Doc. A/777 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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“[n]ever in the history of the United Nations has one private 
individual conducted such a lobby.”15  
Lemkin’s word changed the language as well as the law. 
Its use is not reserved to legal discourse, for it plays a vital 
political role too. Since Lemkin, mass atrocities routinely give 
rise to genocide discourse. The “Is it genocide?” debates recur 
over the Bahais, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Burundi . . . .16 These 
debates prove that genocide matters. It may matter less in law 
than is sometimes believed—but it matters in morality, in 
politics, in policy.17 The Clinton administration cowered before 
the word lest it compel action in Rwanda that the 
Administration did not want to take.18 The Bush 
administration described Darfur as genocide, with the 
President expressly acknowledging the “moral obligation” the 
word entailed,19 but its failure to commit itself publicly to 
further action prompted a political movement successful 
enough to win (over administration objections) passage of the 
first-ever federal statute approving state divestment.20 For a 
meaningful segment of the public, genocide is different—and 
worse—than other atrocities. It is the “crime of crimes.”21 It 
 
 15 WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF 
CRIMES 29 (2d ed. 2009) (quoting JOHN HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 54 (1984)). Evidencing contemporary recognition of 
Lemkin’s singular work on the Genocide Convention, the New York Times ran 
Lemkin’s photograph with the caption “His Idea Adopted” in its story reporting UN 
approval of the Convention. U.N. Votes Accord Banning Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
1948, at 12. See generally Henry La Cossitt, The Man Who Outlawed Genocide, N.Y. 
HERALD TRIB. THIS WEEK MAG., Jan. 7, 1951, at 14; Herbert Yahraes, He Gave a Name 
to the World’s Most Horrible Crime, COLLIER’S, Mar. 3, 1951, at 56. 
 16 See, e.g., A Brief Listing of Some of the Genocidal Acts that Have Occurred 
During the 20th Century, 24 SOC. SCI. REC. 94 (1987).  
 17 See, e.g., Memorandum from Assistant Secretaries of State on “Has 
Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?,” May 21, 1994, at 2-3, available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw052194.pdf (“A USG statement 
that acts of genocide have occurred would not have any particular legal 
consequences. . . . [but it] could increase pressure for USG activism in response to the 
crisis in Rwanda.”). 
 18 For example, a Pentagon memo warned, “Be Careful. Legal at State was 
worried about this yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to 
actually ‘do something.’” See POWER, supra note 9, at 359.  
 19 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, in 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 458, 460 (Apr. 18, 2007) (“No one 
who sees these pictures can doubt that genocide is the only word for what is happening 
in Darfur and that we have a moral obligation to stop it.”). 
 20 See generally Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. 
PENN. J. INT’L L. 823 (2009); Perry S. Bechky, The Politics of Divestment, in THE 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011). 
 21 See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 653-54 (defending “the crime of crimes” 
as the subtitle of his treatise). For a discussion of Lemkin’s use of this phrase, see sources 
cited supra note 7. 
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separates the extraordinarily evil from the ordinarily evil. It 
demands attention, concern, resources—and action.  
The NGO Investors Against Genocide captures this 
point with its tagline: “Draw the Line at Genocide.”22 The small 
print clarifies, however, that the NGO means “genocide or crimes 
against humanity.”23 In other words, it likes the word genocide but 
finds the Conventional definition too cramped to “draw the line” 
there. It is not alone. A recent task force on genocide prevention, 
led by two former U.S. Cabinet Secretaries, made the same 
move.24 Many others deploy genocide as they personally define it, 
often as something akin to extermination of civilians,25 territory 
now covered by crimes against humanity. In truth, the 
Conventional definition is controversial, difficult, narrow, 
nonintuitive, and—unsurprisingly—used mainly by lawyers. The 
public may “draw the line” elsewhere, giving genocide a different 
meaning in morality and politics than in international law. But 
policy often sits at the intersection of politics and law, and therein 
lies the problem with the semantic gap.26 
There is a vast literature criticizing the concept of 
genocide, its definition, and its function and priority in public 
 
 22 See INVESTORS AGAINST GENOCIDE, http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.net 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
 23 See Genocide-Free Investing, INVESTORS AGAINST GENOCIDE, 
http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.net/genocide-freeinvesting (last visited Feb. 1, 
2012) (“The key section of our genocide-free investing shareholder proposal submissions 
says: Shareholders request that the Board institute transparent procedures to prevent 
holding investments in companies that, in management’s judgment, substantially 
contribute to genocide or crimes against humanity, the most egregious violations of 
human rights.” (emphasis added)). 
 24 See, e.g., MADELEINE ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM COHEN, PREVENTING 
GENOCIDE: A BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS, at xxi-xxii (2008). Under the heading 
“Avoiding Definitional Traps,” Albright & Cohen write: 
[T]here is the definitional challenge of invoking the word genocide, which has 
unmatched rhetorical power. The dilemma is how to harness the power of the 
word to motivate and mobilize while not allowing debates about its definition 
or application to constrain or distract policymakers from addressing the core 
problems it describes. To avoid the legalistic arguments that have repeatedly 
impeded timely and effective action, the task force has defined its scope in this 
report as the prevention of “genocide and mass atrocities,” meaning large-scale 
and deliberate attacks on civilians. . . . We use the term genocide in this 
report as a shorthand expression for this wider category of crimes. 
Id. But see William Schabas, “Definitional Traps” and Misleading Titles, 4 GENOCIDE 
STUD. & PREVENTION 177 (2009).  
 25 See ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 15-18 
(2006) (compiling definitions).  
 26 See David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, 
Darfur, and the UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 303-07 (2006) (arguing that a 
definitional gap caused newspapers to misrepresent the “no genocide” conclusion of the 
UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur).  
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discourse.27 Even William Schabas—perhaps the most 
prominent defender today of the Conventional definition—rests 
his defense on the way crimes against humanity has expanded 
since Nuremberg to cover vital territory the Convention leaves 
untouched.28 Other defenders of the genocide concept, like 
David Luban, advocate amendments extending its reach to 
extermination of civilians.29 Leila Sadat recently led a group of 
scholars in drafting a proposed treaty on crimes against 
humanity. Her project seems motivated, at least in substantial 
part, by concern about genocide: the Conventional definition 
does not reach many victims of atrocities, but the word so 
captures the public imagination as to hinder effective action on 
behalf of those victims. Sadat calls this the “obstacle of 
semantic indifference” and blames it for “the victimization of 
millions of human beings.”30  
How should one assess proposals, like those of Luban or 
Sadat, to change what genocide means or how it is used? 
Because past is prologue, a proper foundation for policy 
discourse about genocide’s future should start at the very 
beginning—with Lemkin.  
Lemkin’s coinage of genocide was instrumental, a means 
to an end. The term played a central role in his strategy to 
change the way the world saw and treated the Nazis and 
perpetrators of similar crimes. It was conceived to “build the 
law,”31 to induce the nations of the world to change international 
 
 27 Among the many possible entry points into this literature, see generally 
David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 229 
(2006) (advocating use of “precursors of genocide” and “atrocity crimes”); Symposium, 2 
GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 31 (2007) (articles by Schabas, Minow, Garibian, 
Bazyler, Mennecke, Akhavan, Leven, and Scheffer); Gareth Evans, Crimes Against 
Humanity: Overcoming Indifference, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 325 (2006) (arguing to replace 
genocide as the trigger for intervention with crimes against humanity or Scheffer’s 
“atrocity crimes”); Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1101 (2005) (arguing that genocide should be irrelevant to questions 
about whether to intervene).  
 28 See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 642-47, 653-54. 
 29 See Luban, supra note 26, at 319-20.  
 30 LEILA SADAT, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE PROPOSED 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY 7-8 (2010). 
 31 Rosenthal writes: 
We would say to him: Lemkin, what good will it do to write mass murder 
down as a crime; will a piece of paper stop a new Hitler or Stalin? Then he 
put aside cajolery and his face stiffened. “Only man has law. Law must be 
built, do you understand me? You must build the law!” 
Rosenthal, supra note 1; cf. Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 
1142, 1157 (1949) [hereinafter Yale Commentary] (“Compared with established 
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law, their own domestic laws, and their social norms of 
acceptable state behavior. It was, in short, rhetoric.  
Rhetoric is often described as the “practical art” of 
persuasion.32 To better understand the Genocide Convention 
from the perspective of the man most responsible for it, this 
article draws from the ancient discipline of rhetoric to ask, 
Whom did Lemkin want to persuade to do what, and why did he 
choose this particular means of persuasion? To address these 
questions, this article applies rhetorical theory—in particular, 
Lloyd Bitzer’s idea of the “rhetorical situation”—to a reading of 
nine texts Lemkin published in English during the key period 
between Axis Rule in 1944 and the Genocide Convention in 
194833: Axis Rule; articles in the American Journal of 
International Law, American Scholar, the Christian Science 
Monitor, Free World, the Nation, and the United Nations 
Bulletin; and two letters to the editor in the New York Times.34 
This article makes two contributions to the debate about 
the meaning and value of genocide. First, it offers a new 
conception of genocide as rhetoric. This conception opens the 
door to importing insights from rhetorical scholarship into the 
genocide debate. It describes Lemkin’s rhetorical situation—
particularly the problem for which he saw genocide as the 
solution—and assesses his rhetorical strategy. By focusing on 
Lemkin as an advocate, Bitzer’s prism reveals the extent of 
 
standards of national penal enforcement, the Convention might seem an instrument of 
pioneer justice; but these are pioneer days in world law. Perhaps this is the kind of 
quasi-law from which effective world law may be expected eventually to develop.”). One 
bibliography identifies Lemkin as “a contributor” to this Commentary. See Jim Fussell, 
Comprehensive Bibliography: Writings of Raphael Lemkin, PREVENT GENOCIDE, 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/bibliography.htm (last updated May 26, 2001). 
The bibliography does not explain this conclusion, but it seems plausible: Lemkin was 
working at Yale Law School at the time, see, e.g., JOHN COOPER, RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 119 (2008), and the Commentary 
closely tracks some arguments Lemkin had made elsewhere. See generally Yale 
Commentary, supra.  
 32  See infra Part II. 
 33 After UN approval of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin’s rhetorical 
situation shifted fundamentally from establishing and promoting the concept of 
genocide to securing ratification of the Convention. For a possible example of Lemkin’s 
turn to his ratification project, see Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1151-56.  
 34 Given the focus here on work published in English, additional research 
might be done on the extent to which Lemkin’s archival materials and his writings in 
other languages further illuminate his rhetorical situation. See generally Tanya Elder, 
What You See Before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by Exploring His 
Archival Papers, 1900–1959, 7 J. GENOCIDE RES. 469, 472 (2005) (surveying the 
archival materials available); see also COOPER, supra note 31, at 78, 149 (referencing 
articles Lemkin published in Belgian, French, and Norwegian law journals in 1946 and 
in Le Monde in 1948). 
2012] LEMKIN’S SITUATION 557 
Lemkin’s ambition and achievement: he helped to create 
modern international law. Second, this article provides an 
example of how a Lemkinian understanding of genocide can 
inform the construction of the Convention on pressing matters 
of contemporary controversy. Specifically, it points to a better 
understanding of the Convention’s intent requirement than 
that underpinning the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’s 
“no genocide” conclusion.35  
Part I introduces Lemkin and his genocide project. Part 
II introduces Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, and Parts III and IV 
apply that prism to genocide. Part V assesses Lemkin’s 
rhetorical strategy. Part VI discusses the significance of 
understanding Lemkin’s rhetorical situation to the Genocide 
Convention and to ongoing debates about the role of genocide 
in our international legal order and thereby also illustrates 
how legal scholarship may better utilize Bitzer’s ideas.36 The 
article then concludes. 
I. RAPHAEL LEMKIN AND HIS GENOCIDE PROJECT 
A. Background to Genocide 
Lemkin’s biographers depict him as having both 
personal experience with, and intellectual interests in, atrocity 
and violence from an early age.37 Jews in a nearby town 
suffered a murderous pogrom when Lemkin was about five 
years old. During World War I, Lemkin’s childhood home was 
destroyed, much of his family’s property was seized, and his 
brother Samuel died of illness and malnourishment. As a child, 
Lemkin read “an unusually grim reading list” about “historical 
cases of mass slaughter.”38 
 
 35 Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary-
General ¶¶ 513-18 (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
 36 Bitzer’s work has been underappreciated in legal literature. Among the 
handful of U.S. law review articles that draw on his work, see generally Leigh Hunt 
Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 861 (1995) (arguing, from an example of rhetorical situation analysis of Marbury 
v. Madison, that law schools should integrate legal writing courses with substantive 
courses); Linda Levine & Kurt Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL ED. 108 
(1993) (arguing that law schools should train students in rhetoric, including rhetorical 
situation analysis); Robert Prentice, Supreme Court Rhetoric, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 85 (1983) 
(applying rhetorical situation analysis to Brown v. Board of Education). 
 37 POWER, supra note 9, at 20-21; accord COOPER, supra note 31, at 1-13; 
WILLIAM KOREY, AN EPITAPH FOR RAPHAEL LEMKIN 4-6 (2001). 
 38 POWER, supra note 9, at 20. 
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Lemkin studied law and philology as a university 
student in Lvov, Poland. A news article caught his attention in 
1921. It described the trial in Germany of Soghomon Tehlirian, 
an Armenian who had assassinated Mehmed Talaat for his 
leadership of the Ottoman slaughter of Armenians. Lemkin 
noted the inconsistency between trying Tehlirian for the 
murder of one man when Talaat had escaped prosecution for 
the murder of “more than a million men.”39 On the other hand, 
Lemkin could not approve of individual vengeance as the 
appropriate response. Instead, he sought to make the Talaats 
of the world stand trial for their crimes.40  
To this end, in 1933, Lemkin proposed to an 
international legal conference in Madrid the adoption and 
universal prosecution of two crimes: barbarity and vandalism.41 
Lemkin defined barbarity as an action taken “out of hatred 
towards a racial, religious or social collectivity or with the goal of 
its extermination . . . against the life, the bodily integrity, 
liberty, dignity or the economic existence of a person belonging 
to such a collectivity.”42 He defined vandalism as an action, taken 
with the same motive, which “destroys works of cultural or 
artistic heritage.”43 Although Lemkin regarded Hitler’s ascension 
to power that year as an urgent justification to legislate against 
these crimes, at least some participants in Madrid deemed his 
proposal irrelevant to a Europe years removed from the First 
World War. The conference “tabled” Lemkin’s proposal.44  
The failure of barbarity and vandalism informed 
Lemkin’s later effort to coin and promote genocide. Lemkin 
 
 39 Id. at 17 (quoting Lemkin). 
 40 Id. at 2-19.  
 41 The Madrid conference was the fifth in a series of intergovernmental 
meetings to promote international cooperation on criminal matters. It was hosted by 
the Spanish government and attended mainly by states. The conference adopted texts 
on arms, family abandonment, prostitution, and terrorism. The conference was 
organized in cooperation with the League of Nations, but states that were not members 
of the League (such as the United States) also participated. See generally ACTES DE LA 
CONFERÉNCE, VE CONFERÉNCE INTERNATIONALE POUR L’UNIFICATION DU DROIT PÉNAL 
(1935); Report of the Secretary General on Penal and Penitentiary Questions, League of 
Nations Doc. A.14.1934.IV, at 7 (1934) (summarizing the conference results). Lemkin’s 
proposal is printed in French in the ACTES DE LA CONFERÉNCE, supra, at 48. I have relied 
on James Fussell’s unofficial English translation. Acts Constituting a General 
(Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations, PREVENT 
GENOCIDE, http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Lemkin, Madrid Proposal].  
 42 Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, proposed art. 1. 
 43 Id. art. 2. 
 44 See POWER, supra note 9, at 21-22. 
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learned not to rely on existing words to define new crimes.45 
Instead, according to Samantha Power: 
Lemkin saw he needed a word that could not be used in other 
contexts (as “barbarity” and “vandalism” could). He self-consciously 
sought one that would bring with it “a color of freshness and novelty” 
while describing something “as shortly and as poignantly as 
possible.” . . . Somehow it had to chill listeners and invite immediate 
condemnation.46 
B. Axis Rule and Other Lemkin Texts 
Early in World War II, Lemkin escaped from invaded 
Poland to Lithuania and then Sweden. A professor at Duke 
Law School with whom he had collaborated then helped 
Lemkin receive both permission to immigrate to the United 
States and an appointment at Duke. Lemkin journeyed across 
Russia, the Pacific, and North America to reach Duke. In the 
summer of 1942, Lemkin left Duke for Washington to consult 
with the U.S. Board of Economic Warfare.47 Lemkin started 
writing Axis Rule in Sweden in 1940, continued his work at 
Duke, and ultimately finished the book in Washington.48 
Axis Rule is “a catalogue raisonné of Nazi legislation in 
occupied territory.”49 The bulk of the book consists of a country-
by-country litany of German actions in nineteen occupied 
territories, supported by a compilation of “statutes, decrees, 
and other documents” translated into English. The book begins, 
however, with “a rational synthesis”—a relatively short 
overview—of “German techniques of occupation.”50 Chapter IX, 
entitled “Genocide,” is the last chapter of this overview. 
Lemkin presents his word in this passage:  
By “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group. . . . [G]enocide does not necessarily mean the immediate 
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of 
all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated 
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating 
the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be 
disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
 
 45 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79 (“New conceptions require new terms.”). 
 46 POWER, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting Lemkin). Lemkin drew on George 
Eastman’s explanation for the name Kodak: “First. It is short. Second. It is not capable 
of mispronunciation. Third. It does not resemble anything in the art . . . .” Id. at 41-42. 
 47 See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383. 
 48 See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiv. 
 49 Luban, supra note 26, at 307. 
 50 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at ix. 
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language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of 
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such 
groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, 
and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their 
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.51  
Genocide thus brings together elements of Lemkin’s barbarity 
and vandalism in a single new concept.52 With Axis Rule, 
Lemkin “renew[ed]” his effort to create a new international 
crime.53 For example, given the opportunity to write a one-page 
memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt, Lemkin urged the 
President to negotiate a treaty banning genocide.54 
After Axis Rule, Lemkin vigorously promoted genocide and 
his proposal for a treaty outlawing it. By the time the United 
Nations approved the Genocide Convention, Lemkin had written 
numerous articles advocating this action, testified before 
Congress in support of “war crimes” prosecutions,55 consulted with 
the Nuremberg prosecutors,56 wrote the first draft of General 
Assembly Resolution 96(I), served on the UN experts committee 
that prepared the first draft of the Genocide Convention,57 gave 
speeches, and lobbied diplomats and journalists.  
 
 51 Id. at 79; see also id. at xi (previewing genocide in a summary of the book’s 
contents).  
 52 Despite many similarities between genocide and its forerunners, there are 
meaningful differences. For example, Lemkin does not repeat in Axis Rule the specific 
motive requirement (“out of hatred”) that he had specified for barbarity and vandalism. 
See generally id.; cf. Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, proposed arts. 1-2. 
 53 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiii (“[T]he author [made] a proposal . . . in 
Madrid in 1933 . . . that an international treaty should be negotiated declaring that attacks 
upon national, religious, and ethnic groups should be made international crimes . . . . His 
proposal not having been adopted at that time, he feels impelled to renew it now . . . .”); see 
also Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 
148 (1947) [hereinafter Lemkin, AJIL] (describing his work on G.A. Res. 96 (I) as a “return 
to the postulates submitted . . . in Madrid in 1933”). 
 54 See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383. I have not been able 
to locate Lemkin’s memorandum to Roosevelt or further details about it. James Fussell has 
reported his own unsuccessful efforts to find the same memorandum at the Roosevelt 
archive in Hyde Park. See James Fussell, Lemkin’s War: Origins of the Term “Genocide,” 
Speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (Mar. 11, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/analysis/details.php?content=2003-03-11). On the gaps in 
Lemkin’s archives, see generally Elder, supra note 34. 
 55 See Punishment of War Criminals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Aff. On H. J. Res. 93, 79th Cong. 61-62 (1945) (statement of Raphael Lemkin) 
[hereinafter Lemkin Statement] (advocating prosecution of “extermination of peoples” 
without mentioning the word genocide).  
 56 See Barrett, supra note 12, at 47-51 (describing a limited and somewhat 
strained arrangement). 
 57 See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 60-64, 77. 
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Public revulsion against war created a “Grotian 
moment,”58 when there was a public hunger to build a new 
international legal order committed to collective security and 
human rights.59 Lemkin reached official circles in Washington 
in 1942 and published Axis Rule in 1944, both early enough to 
participate in this creative moment.60 He had the idea, the 
rhetorical strategy, the energy, the talent,61 the timing, and the 
gumption to contribute genocide to the postwar agenda—and 
then the will and the stamina to persevere across the 
increasingly harsh terrain of the Cold War. By the time 
Resolution 96(I) passed, Winston Churchill had given his “iron 
curtain” speech; by the time the Genocide Convention opened 
for signature, the Soviets had boycotted the Marshall Plan, the 
Berlin blockade and airlift were underway, and the red star 
had risen over Czechoslovakia and much of mainland China; by 
the time the Convention entered into effect, China had crossed 
the Yalu into the Korean War.62  
After the Convention entered into force, Lemkin 
continued to devote himself to securing ratifications.63 At his 
death in August 1959, the Convention had sixty-one state 
parties.64  
 
 58 I borrow the phrase from Michael Scharf’s Grotian Moment blog but extend it 
beyond significant “legal developments” within international law to encompass 
transformative political developments reshaping that law. See GROTIAN MOMENT: THE 
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL BLOG, http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/ 
index.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).  
 59 See, e.g., Atlantic Charter, Official Statement on Meeting Between the 
President and Prime Minister Churchill (Aug. 14, 1941), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp (describing the “common principles” on which 
Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill “base their hopes for a better future for the 
world”); Decl. by the U.N. (Jan. 1, 1942), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
20th_century/decade03.asp (committing to the Atlantic Charter); Moscow Decl. of the 
Four Nations on General Security (Oct. 30, 1943), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
wwii/moscow.asp [hereinafter Moscow Declaration] (“recogniz[ing] the necessity of 
establishing . . . a general international organization . . . for the international peace and 
security”); U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1-2, 39-51 (establishing arrangements aimed at 
collective security). 
 60 See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383; Barrett, supra note 
12, at 38.  
 61 Notably, a talent for language. See, e.g., Raphael Lemkin, Genocide Foe, 
Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1959 (Lemkin “was fluent in nine languages”). 
 62 See generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY (2005).  
 63  See POWER, supra note 9, at 61-78. 
 64 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
UNTS ONLINE, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid 
=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) 
[hereinafter UNTS Online] (adjusted for UN membership in 1959 (e.g., counting China 
and Vietnam as parties from the dates their “Republics” adhered, rather than the later 
dates of their “People’s Republics”)).  
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II. BITZER’S RHETORICAL SITUATION 
Before examining Lemkin’s coinage of genocide as 
rhetoric, we must pause to introduce the discipline of rhetoric, 
especially Bitzer’s idea of the rhetorical situation. 
In On Rhetoric, Aristotle defines his subject as “an 
ability . . . to see the available means of persuasion.”65 
Accordingly, rhetoric is often described as the “practical art” of 
persuasion.66 It is “an art of emphasis”67 or a “science of human 
attention-structures.”68 It is “not concerned with permanence, 
nor yet with beauty. It is concerned with effect.”69 It “helps to 
produce or solicit judgments or decisions regarding practical 
issues and pressing public problems.”70 In the words of Francis 
Bacon, “The duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to 
imagination for the better moving of the will.”71 Accordingly, 
Bitzer observes, “[A] work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes 
into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it 
functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it 
performs some task.”72  
Bitzer introduces the concept of the rhetorical 
situation.73 He argues that this concept is crucial, because “a 
rhetorical situation must exist as a necessary condition of 
rhetorical discourse, just as a question must exist as a 
necessary condition of an answer.”74 He defines a rhetorical 
 
 65 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 2.1 (George 
Kennedy, trans., 1991). Kennedy explains that his translation renders “to grasp the 
meaning or utility of . . . what is inherently and potentially persuasive in the facts, 
circumstances, character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc.” Id. at 36 n.34 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66 See, e.g., RICHARD LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 132 (2d ed. 
1991); cf. WHITE, supra note 2, at xi-xii, 28 (describing rhetoric as “that art by which 
culture and community and character are constituted and transformed,” which 
includes but also exceeds “the art of persuading others”).  
 67 JAMES JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN 
CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL STUDIES 12 (2001) (quoting Richard Weaver, Language Is 
Sermonic, in CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF RHETORIC: SELECTED READINGS 173 (R.L. 
Johannesen ed., 1971)). 
 68 LANHAM, supra note 66, at 134. 
 69 JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 191 (quoting H.A. Wichelns, The Literary 
Criticism of Oratory, in STUDIES IN RHETORIC AND PUBLIC SPEAKING IN HONOR OF 
JAMES ALBERT WINANS, 209 (A. M. Drummond ed., 1925)).  
 70 Id. at 192. 
 71 LANHAM, supra note 66, at 131. 
 72 Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 3-4 (1968). 
 73 See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 514. 
 74 Bitzer, supra note 72, at 5-6. Bitzer originally presented the rhetorical 
situation as an objective fact to which speakers respond, but critics argued that speakers 
have a constitutive role in creating and defining the rhetorical situation, prompting 
Bitzer to acknowledge that a speaker’s “thoughts” are “parts of historical reality,” that is, 
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situation “as a complex of persons, events, objects, and 
relations presenting an actual or potential exigence[,] which 
can be completely or partially removed if discourse . . . can so 
constrain human decision or action as to bring about the 
significant modification of the exigence.”75 Bitzer identifies the 
“three constituents of any rhetorical situation”: the exigence, 
the audience, and “the constraints which influence the rhetor 
and can be brought to bear upon the audience.”76 
First, an exigence “is a defect, an obstacle, something 
waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be.”77 
It “is the necessary condition of a rhetorical situation. If there 
were no exigence, there would be nothing to require or invite 
change. . . . [T]he exigence provides motive.”78 Not all exigences 
are rhetorical. Aristotle explains that the “political 
orator . . . does not deal with all things, but only 
with . . . . [those matters] which we have it in our power to set 
going.”79 Ralph Waldo Emerson concurs: “You [might be] a very 
elegant writer, but you can’t write up what gravitates down.”80 
Thus, to be rhetorical, an exigence must be capable of change 
(unlike death or gravity)—and discourse must be capable of 
effecting or assisting that change.81 Bitzer identifies air 
pollution as a rhetorical exigence, because the reduction of 
pollution “strongly invites the assistance of discourse producing 
public awareness, indignation, and action of the right kind.”82 
Second, a rhetorical audience “consists only of those 
persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of 
 
of the rhetorical situation. See Lloyd F. Bitzer, Functional Communication: A Situational 
Perspective, in RHETORIC IN TRANSITION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE AND USES OF RHETORIC 
21, 25 (Eugene E. White ed., 1980) [hereinafter Bitzer, Functional Communication]; 
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 516-17 (noting that “[m]ost rhetorical scholars” conclude that 
discourse both “responds to [and] creates situations”). 
 75 Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. 
 78 Bitzer, Functional Communication, supra note 74, at 26. 
 79 JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 160 (quoting ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1359a31-
1359a39 (W.R. Roberts trans., 1954)).  
 80 Id. at 159 (quoting 8 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Eloquence, in THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 109, 131 (1904)). 
 81 See Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6-7. White illustrates the distinction in his 
discussion of Sophocles’ Philoctetes, in which Odysseus and Neoptolemus seek to 
retrieve Heracles’ magic bow from Philoctetes to satisfy a prophecy. See WHITE, supra 
note 2, at 3-27. They learn, however, that the prophecy requires not only the bow, but 
the voluntary participation of Philoctetes. Id. While force or trickery might obtain the 
bow itself, the owner’s free cooperation can be achieved only through discourse—thus 
presenting a rhetorical exigence. Id. 
 82 Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6-7. 
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being mediators of change.”83 The audience must have open 
minds and must be “capable of making the final decision” or 
“capable of influencing those with final decision-making 
authority.”84 Following this distinction, in democratic politics, a 
rhetorical audience includes the public as a whole, because the 
public is capable of influencing the government’s agenda, 
priorities, and outcomes. 
Third, rhetorical constraints are those “parts of the 
situation . . . [that] have the power to constrain decision and 
action needed to modify the exigence,” and they typically include 
“beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, 
interests, motives and the like.”85 Constraints are “circumstances 
that interfere with . . . an advocate’s ability to respond to an 
exigence. . . . Circumstantial constraints are, in effect, mini-
exigences; they are secondary problems that an advocate must 
negotiate or deal with to resolve the dominant exigence.”86  
Finally, just as circumstances may present obstacles for 
a speaker to overcome, they may also supply “material that can 
work to the advocate’s advantage.”87 Accordingly, in later work, 
Bitzer adds rhetorical resources as another element of the 
rhetorical situation.88 
As a simple example of a rhetorical exercise, children 
may attempt to persuade their parents (i.e., their rhetorical 
audience) to raise their allowances. In making this effort, the 
children will have to persuade their parents that there is an 
“exigence”—“a thing which is other than it should be.”89 The 
children share this challenge—they must establish the existence 
of a problem as a precondition to persuading the audience to 
adopt a solution—with many advocates. “[D]efining the situation 
often is the most fundamental exigence faced by advocates. It is 
 
 83 Id. at 8. Aristotle identifies three species of rhetoric depending whether the 
audience is a decision-maker or spectator (as in a eulogy) and, if the former, whether 
the decision concerns past events (as in a trial) or future events (as in policy 
deliberations). See ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 47; see also George Kennedy, 
Introduction, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 15. 
 84 See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 515 (discussing R.E. Crable & S.L. Vibbert, 
Managing Issues and Influencing Public Policy, 6 PUB. REL. REV. 3 (1985)). 
 85 Bitzer, supra note 72, at 8. 
 86 JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 516. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. More precisely, Bitzer came to acknowledge that “constraints” include 
“opportunities” as well as “limitations,” and that “[t]he rhetor’s central creative task is 
to discover and make use of proper constraints,” i.e., the available resources, in order to 
navigate the limitations and persuade the audience. Bitzer, Functional 
Communication, supra note 74, at 23-24. 
 89 Bitzer, supra note 72, at 6-7. 
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virtually impossible to persuade an audience to adopt a policy 
proposal if audience members do not perceive a need.”90 Rahm 
Emanuel expresses the same insight in his maxim: “You never 
want a serious crisis to go to waste. . . . [I]t’s an opportunity to 
do things you could not do before.”91 
The children in our example likely enjoy many 
advantages often lacked by political advocates, such as direct 
access to the ultimate decision-makers; an ability to command 
the decision-makers’ attention; an audience well-disposed to 
the advocates (if not to their arguments); and a proposed 
solution that many decision-makers can implement without 
excessive burden. Political advocates act in a world with 
“simultaneous rhetorical situations,” which compete for the 
attention of the same audience at the same time.92 Political 
advocates will struggle to persuade even sympathetic decision-
makers and members of the public that their concerns warrant 
attention and action. In other words, political advocates will 
often find that their main obstacle is “inertia” and their main 
task is “to energize and activate audiences.”93 
Our hypothetical children will likely assert that their 
current allowance fails to meet their needs and appeal, 
expressly or implicitly, to parental duty and desire to address 
their children’s needs. Our hypothetical parents, in turn, will 
likely give meaningful consideration to this value of 
helpfulness. But the parents will likely consider other values as 
well, such as the parental obligation to teach patience, thrift, 
and work ethic. Thus, the parents’ decision whether to raise 
the allowance requires “balancing or negotiating competing 
principles.”94 Public matters that present similar tensions 
between competing principles, known as “prudential 
dilemmas,”95 are often resolved by constructing “value 
hierarchies”; significantly, such hierarchies are not permanent, 
because later advocates may contest them with new 
circumstances, concepts, distinctions, or priorities.96 
 
 90 JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 158, 517. 
 91 See David Leonhardt, The Big Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, (Magazine), at 
22 (quoting “Rahm’s Doctrine”). 
 92 See Bitzer, supra note 72, at 12. 
 93 See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 458, 519.  
 94 Id. at 522. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See id. at 522, 597-98. 
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III. LEMKIN’S EXIGENCE  
Tehlirian’s assassination of Talaat, as mentioned, 
sparked Lemkin’s interest in developing an international legal 
regime for mass atrocity.97 When Lemkin asked one of his 
professors why Talaat had not been prosecuted for Ottoman 
crimes against Armenians, the professor responded: “Consider 
the case of a farmer who owns a flock of chickens. He kills them 
and this is his business. If you interfere, you are trespassing.”98  
Lemkin’s professor thus interposed the norms of 
sovereignty and nonintervention as a bar to external prosecution 
of crimes committed by a state within its territory against its 
own nationals. To achieve his objective of international 
criminalization, Lemkin had to overcome this bar. This was his 
rhetorical exigence. To understand it, this section will first 
introduce the concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention. 
A. A Brief Introduction to Sovereignty 
The International Court of Justice has called 
sovereignty “the fundamental principle . . . on which the whole 
of international law rests.”99 Its “core meaning” might be said to 
be “supreme authority within a territory.”100 Yet any such 
definition necessarily oversimplifies the extent to which the 
word’s true content and significance have been (and remain) 
unclear, contested, and changeable.101 Lassa Oppenheim traces 
the history of the word sovereignty from its introduction by 
Bodin in 1577, concluding “there is not and never was 
unanimity regarding this conception.”102 Some scholars thus 
 
 97 See supra Part I.A. 
 98 POWER, supra note 9, at 17.  
 99 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 263 (June 27). 
 100 Dan Philpott, Sovereignty, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer ed. 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/sum2010/entries/sovereignty/. 
 101 Indeed, Philpott goes on to discuss historical and contemporary challenges 
to this definition. Id.  
 102 L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 111-15 (2d ed. 1912); cf. 
LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 9 (1995) (attributing 
difficulties with sovereignty, in part, to the word’s emergence from “the misty 
antecedents of the modern international system” in “inter-prince relations” before 
Westphalia); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 866 (1990) (“Since Aristotle, the term 
‘sovereignty’ has had a long and varied history during which it has been given different 
meanings, hues and tones, depending on the context and the objectives of those using 
the word.”); James N. Rosenau, Sovereignty in a Turbulent World, in BEYOND 
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suggest that sovereignty is too vague a word, too steeped in 
myth and mysticism, for practical use in the modern world.103 
To appreciate Lemkin’s rhetorical situation, it is 
important to introduce sovereignty as it was seen between the 
world wars. Some indication can be found in the 1927 Lotus 
case, where France claimed that international law barred 
Turkey from asserting jurisdiction over French sailors on board 
a French ship for colliding with a Turkish ship on the high 
seas. The Permanent Court ruled for Turkey and declared, 
The rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own 
free will. . . . Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot 
therefore be presumed. . . . [A]ll that can be required of a State is 
that it should not overstep the limits which international law places 
upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise 
jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.104 
The Lotus Court thus revealed a conception of sovereignty as 
freedom from external constraint—except only those 
international legal obligations consented-to by the state’s “own 
free will.” Robert Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State during 
World War I, revealed a similar conception in his remark that 
“[t]he essence of sovereignty [is] the absence of 
responsibility.”105 Gareth Evans and Akhil Amar nicely capture 
this notion of sovereignty in their respective quips that 
“sovereignty is a license to kill”106 and “[s]overeignty means 
never having to say you’re sorry.”107 
 
WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 191 (Gene M. 
Lyons & Michael Mastaduno eds., 1995) (proposing a “turbulence model” of constant 
competition along a “sovereignty continuum”).  
 103 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 102, at 10-12, 100-01 (proposing to abandon 
the word sovereignty in favor of a “decompose[d]” list of the “essential characteristics 
and indicia of statehood today”); W. Michael Reisman, International Law and 
Organization for a New World Order: The Uppsala Model, General Report of JUS 1981, 
in THE SPIRIT OF UPPSALA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT UNITAR-UPPSALA UNIVERSITY 
SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 27, 31-
32 (Atle Grahl-Madsen & Jiri Toman eds., 1984) (“I suggest we eschew the term 
[sovereignty] and address ourselves to the empirical questions which are really at 
issue.”); Richard Lillich, Sovereignty and Humanity: Can They Converge?, in THE 
SPIRIT OF UPPSALA, supra, at 406 (“[T]he concept of sovereignty . . . is an idea whose 
time has come and gone.”).  
 104 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7) 
[hereinafter The Lotus]. Even here, however, the extent of contestation over sovereignty 
is revealed: the court split, six-to-six, with the judgment decided solely by a tie-
breaking rule. See id. at 33. 
 105 POWER, supra note 9, at 14. 
 106 Evans, supra note 27, at 331. 
 107 AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 336 (2005). 
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The Lotus decision and the Permanent Court itself 
should be seen in the context of the international political order 
created after the Great War. This order arose from the 
upheaval the War had wrought in the prior political order, 
including the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and 
Ottoman Empires; the Soviet Revolution; a radical new balance 
of power; the redrawing of European borders; and the 
emergence of new European states together with the modern 
vocabulary of self-determination.108 And the new order aimed 
toward one paramount (and ultimately failed) objective: 
avoiding another world war.  
Mark Janis describes the interwar period as a “time of 
state-centric high positivism.”109 Norms emerged that favored 
consolidating notions of statehood, protecting weaker states, 
and encouraging cooperation amongst states. For example, the 
Inter-American Montevideo Convention of 1933 ascribes to 
each state the following rights: “integrity and independence”; 
juridical equality and “equal capacity” with other states; 
jurisdiction over all inhabitants within its territory (including 
foreign nationals); territorial inviolability; and the rights “to 
organize itself as it sees fit” and “to legislate upon its 
interests.”110 It also provides, “No state has the right to 
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”111  
Without defining sovereignty, the Montevideo 
Convention reveals its essential content—as seen by its 
authors during the interwar years. It regards nonintervention 
as vital to sovereignty. In this, it resonates with the Lotus 
decision: “Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of 
a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power 
 
 108 See MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY, at xxi, 
473-536, 580-82 (1994) (describing the end of the war and its effects on the twentieth 
century); WALTER CONSUALO LANGSAM, THE WORLD SINCE 1914, at 116-19 (5th ed. 1943). 
 109 MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS, 1776-1939, at 
208 (2010).  
 110 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States arts. 3, 4, 9, 11, 
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
 111 Id. art. 8. The American states reaffirmed this bar on intervention three 
years later. See Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, done at Buenos 
Aires, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41; see also R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 113 (1974) (“What was remarkable [about the Buenos Aires 
Protocol] was that the United States should bind herself by treaty to the observation of 
an apparently absolute rule of nonintervention, allowing none of the exceptions with 
which she had increasingly indulged herself.”).  
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in any form in the territory of another State.”112 Schabas 
describes this view of sovereignty as “a form of quid pro quo by 
which States agreed, in effect, to mind their own business. 
What went on within the borders of a sovereign State was a 
matter that concerned nobody but the State itself.”113 
Recalling the contested nature of sovereignty, however, 
some developments should be noted that pushed against the 
era’s dominant state-centric trend. The Treaty of Versailles 
obliged defeated states and new states, over their sovereignty-
based objections, to respect the rights of minorities.114 Versailles 
also created the International Labor Organization to address 
domestic labor conditions, premised in part on “sentiments of 
justice and humanity.”115 The Institut de Droit International 
produced a Declaration of the International Rights of Man to 
constrain states’ treatment of their own nationals.116 The 
International Law Association called for the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court with “jurisdiction over all offenses 
committed contrary to the laws of humanity and the dictates of 
public conscience”; this proposal generated enough state interest 
to produce a draft convention, which then withered in the face of 
war.117 Successive editions of the Oppenheim treatise render a 
verdict on the limited impact these developments had on the 
 
 112 The Lotus, supra note 104, at 18; accord League of Nations Covenant art. 
10 (protecting “territorial integrity and . . . political independence”); id. art. 15, para. 8 
(barring the League from making any recommendations to settle a dispute found to 
“arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction of [one] party”); Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (The 
Saavedra Lamas Treaty) art. II, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3363 (“[T]erritorial questions 
must not be settled by violence . . . .”). 
 113 SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 2.  
 114 See, e.g., Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and 
Germany art. 93, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles] 
(obliging Poland to enter a treaty “to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland who 
differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion”). See generally 
I LASSA OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 650-55 (Hersch Lauterpacht 
ed., 7th ed. 1948) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, I OPPENHEIM’S 7TH]; Thomas 
Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
783, 783-85 (2006) (discussing interwar minority protections as precedent to modern 
human rights law). 
 115 Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, pmbl., June 28, 
1919, 49 Stat. 2712.  
 116 Institut de Droit International, Decl. of the Int’l Rights of Man, Oct. 12, 
1929, reprinted in George Finch, The International Rights of Man, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 
662, 663-64 (1941); see also Phillip Marshall Brown, The New York Session of the 
Institut de Droit International, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 127 (1930) (describing the 
Declaration as “a revolutionary document” that “marks a new era which is more 
concerned with the interests and rights of sovereign individuals than with the rights of 
sovereign states”). 
 117 JANIS, supra note 109, at 207-11. 
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state of the law: the treatise moved from dismissing “so-called 
rights of mankind” outright as nonexistent and inconsistent 
with the nature of international law118 to acknowledging the 
existence of some relevant state practice that was “not without 
significance” but did not yet have “the legal effect of 
incorporating the fundamental rights of man as part of the 
positive law of nations.”119  
B. A Brief Introduction to Nonintervention 
The nonintervention norm protects sovereignty.120 Like 
sovereignty itself, it is contested. In the words of Louis Henkin, 
“[T]he norm against intervention . . . is difficult to define, to 
separate the permissible from the impermissible . . . .”121 Once 
again, time and politics have contributed to ambiguity and 
change. “The frontiers protected by the principle of 
nonintervention are unclear at any one time, they vary over 
time, and they are defined differently by different statesmen—
Castlereagh or Palmerston, Theodore or Franklin Roosevelt, 
Khrushchev or Brezhnev.”122  
Two issues arise about the interwar scope of the 
nonintervention norm. Did the norm extend beyond military 
intervention to prohibiting criticism and other nonmilitary 
interference (a word sometimes used to distinguish such acts 
from military intervention)? And was the norm limited so as to 
permit intervention for humanitarian purposes in certain 
circumstances? Ellery Stowell’s 1921 treatise on Intervention in 
International Law provides abundant evidence that both issues 
were contested.123  
 
 118 OPPENHEIM, supra note 102, at 367-69; I LASSA OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 461-63 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920) 
[hereinafter ROXBURGH, OPPENHEIM’S 3d]. 
 119 LAUTERPACHT, I OPPENHEIM’S 7TH, supra note 114, at 583-85. 
 120 See VINCENT, supra note 111, at 14 (“The function . . . of nonintervention . . . [is] 
protecting the principle of state sovereignty.”); HENKIN, supra note 102, at 110 (“All states 
insist on the norm of non-intervention, but it is the favorite norm of the weak and the small, an 
expression of their equality as well as a safeguard of their independence and autonomy.”). See 
generally Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L., 
www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e1434& 
recno=1&author=Kunig%20%20Philip (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
 121 HENKIN, supra note 102, at 110.  
 122 VINCENT, supra note 111, at 15-16; see also id. at 139 (“[I]t might be more 
accurate to refer to American doctrines of nonintervention than to one doctrine . . . .”). 
 123 See generally ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1921). We know that Lemkin was familiar with Stowell’s work, at least by the 1950s, 
because he discusses it in an unfinished manuscript. See Raphael Lemkin, Introduction 
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First, Stowell gives examples showing that states 
sometimes overcome the pull of nonintervention to criticize 
internal affairs in other states. Even these examples 
demonstrate, however, that the nonintervention norm exerted 
some degree of influence. The norm manifested itself in the 
(predictable) reactions of the criticized states and in the ways 
that the criticizing states calibrated,124 justified, and portrayed 
their comments. For instance, in 1882, the U.S. government 
authorized a diplomat to “express the hope” that Russia “will 
find means . . . to cease” the mistreatment of its Jewish 
population, but no more and only that much “with all proper 
deference” and “if a favorable opportunity offers” in the 
diplomat’s “wide discretion.”125 By contrast, these instructions 
continued, if U.S. citizens are injured by Russian persecution, 
“you will feel it your duty to omit no effort to protect them.”126  
Second, Stowell argues for a humanitarian limit on the 
norm of nonintervention.127 He lists authorities supporting 
humanitarian intervention (including Grotius) and opponents 
(including Vattel).128 He describes “Turkey’s persecutions of the 
Armenians” as an instance when “the United States has felt 
constrained by the obligations of a common humanity to intervene 
diplomatically.”129 Even as Stowell presents it, however, the U.S. 
comments were limited to “‘merely . . . informing Turkey that the 
American people already [we]re so stirred by the reported 
massacres that a continuance of the atrocities might [have] 
result[ed] in a break in the friendly relations between the two 
peoples,’” because the reports “‘caus[ed] unfriendly criticism 
among the people of the United States.’”130 A fuller picture shows 
the ways in which the nonintervention norm (together with the 
U.S. interest in staying neutral in World War I) constrained the 
 
to the Study of Genocide 60-64, published in STEVEN JACOBS, LEMKIN ON GENOCIDE 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Lemkin, Introduction].  
 124 Cf. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND 
THE ROLE OF LAW 26 (1974) (“Do we believe that the behaviour of a man travelling 65 miles 
an hour on a super-highway with a 60-mile speed-limit was not constrained by law?”).  
 125 STOWELL, supra note 123, at 73-76 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(printing the instructions given to the American Chargé at St. Petersburg). 
 126 Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127 See id. at 51-62. Stowell argues that intervention, even the “reliance upon 
force,” may be allowed “for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of 
another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to 
exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with 
reason and justice.” Id. at 53 (citation omitted). 
 128 Id. at 53-59. 
 129 Id. at 80. 
 130 Id. at 81-82 (quoting a report printed in the N.Y. EVENING POST, Oct. 5, 1915). 
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U.S. response. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr. led the 
push for U.S. action that “may possibly have the effect of 
checking [Turkey’s] Government and certainly provide an 
opportunity for efficient relief,” notwithstanding “the principles 
of non-interference with the internal affairs of another 
country.”131 Washington approved a limited criticism of 
Ottoman atrocities, but no actions capable of effectively 
“checking,” or providing “efficient relief” from, those atrocities. 
Stowell considers humanitarian intervention legal and 
criticizes states that fail to embrace it.132 By contrast, 
Oppenheim writes that, although supported by “[m]any jurists” 
and some instances of state practice, “whether there is really a 
rule of the Law of Nations which admits such [humanitarian] 
interventions may well be doubted.”133 The debate about the 
existence of a humanitarian exception to the nonintervention 
norm formed part of Lemkin’s rhetorical situation. 
C. Lemkin’s Exigence: Bounding Sovereignty 
World War II ultimately made plain the need for a new 
international legal order. The dominant interwar conception of 
absolute sovereignty attracted its share of blame for the war. 
Philip Jessup denounced this “archfiction” as “the quicksand 
upon which the foundations of traditional international law are 
built.”134 Robert Jackson condemned the “anarchic concept” of 
 
 131 POWER, supra note 9, at 6-8 & 519 nn.13 & 20 (quoting statements of 
Henry Morgenthau, July 10 & Aug. 11, 1915).  
 132 See, e.g., STOWELL, supra note 123, at v, 51-52. In a passage about British and 
French actions in the 1830s concerning Russian mistreatment of Poles, Stowell writes: 
Notwithstanding these attempts to find a ground of justification more 
satisfactory than humanity, the intervening powers did, withal, concurrently 
and sometimes incidentally, refer to considerations of humanity. But they did 
it hesitatingly—almost shamefacedly—as though this, the only juridical basis 
upon which their action could be defended, was not one which they cared to 
present as the real justification of their intervention. 
Id. at 110-11 (citation omitted); see also id. at 187 n.88 (discussing actions taken by a 
U.S. consul in Peru, “We note here an embarrassment evidently due to the unfortunate 
and unfounded belief that intervention upon the ground of humanity is not justifiable 
in international law. We find this same erroneous opinion expressed by Secretary 
Knox . . . .”).  
 133 OPPENHEIM, supra note 102, at 194; accord ROXBURGH, OPPENHEIM’S 3d, 
supra note 118, at 229 (same). Oppenheim adds, “[I]t may perhaps be said that in time 
the Law of Nations will recognise the rule that interventions in the interest of humanity 
are admissible” when done collectively. OPPENHEIM, supra note 102, at 194-95.  
 134 PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 2, 12 
(1948); cf. Robert Keohane, Political Authority After Intervention: Gradations in 
Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL 
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absolute sovereignty: “It would be hard to devise an intellectual 
discipline that would do more to encourage international 
lawlessness and aggression.”135 
Lemkin too censures the prevailing conception of 
sovereignty, highlighting its role in the failure of the interwar 
legal order to constrain domestic atrocities. He writes, “[T]he 
genocide policy begun by Germany on its own Jewish citizens 
in 1933 was considered as an internal problem which the 
German state, as a sovereign power, should handle without 
interference by other states.”136 Lemkin also criticizes as 
unjustified and “isolationist” the “opinion” that “a state’s 
treatment of its own nationals is an internal matter and of no 
concern to other states.”137 He argues that international law 
imposes a duty on each state not to “‘menace international 
peace and order, and to this end it must treat its own 
population in a way which will not violate the dictates of 
humanity and justice or shock the conscience of mankind.’”138  
Lemkin begins another article by situating genocide 
squarely in the sovereignty debate: 
The practices of the National Socialist Government in 
Germany . . . gave impetus to a reconsideration of certain principles 
of international law. The question arose whether sovereignty goes so 
far that a government can destroy with impunity its own citizens 
and whether such acts of destruction are domestic affairs or matters 
of international concern.139  
Indeed, according to his unfinished memoir, Lemkin engaged 
with the sovereignty debate from the very start of his rhetorical 
 
DILEMMAS 275, 298 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Keohane eds., 2003) (criticizing the 
“Westphalian fetish of total autonomy from external authority”). 
 135 Robert H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect: Legal Answer to International 
Lawlessness, 35 A.B.A. J. 813, 813 (1949), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
NUREMBERG TRIAL 354, 355 (Guénaël Mettraux ed., 2008). 
 136 Raphael Lemkin, Genocide—A Modern Crime, 4 FREE WORLD 39, 43 (1945), 
available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/freeworld1945.htm [hereinafter 
Lemkin, Modern Crime]; cf. Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, Genocide Before the 
U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1946, at C22 (objecting that mass murder and mass 
sterilization were regarded as an “internal concern” or “internal affair”). 
 137 Raphael Lemkin, The Legal Case Against Hitler, Part II, NATION, Mar. 10, 
1945, at 268 [hereinafter Lemkin, Legal Case II]. Echoing Stowell, Lemkin lists 
“instances of states expressing their concern about another state’s treatment of its own 
citizens” and treaties concerning such treatment. Id. at 268-69; see also Lemkin, 
Introduction, supra note 123, at 65-66 (listing ten “Persecutions as Grounds for 
Humanitarian Intervention”). 
 138 Lemkin, The Legal Case II, supra note 137, at 269 (quoting “a study published 
in 1944 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace”). 
 139 Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 145-46. 
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project. In his college anecdote,140 Lemkin opposed an absolutist 
view of sovereignty:  
I felt that a law against . . . racial or religious murder must be 
adopted by the world . . . I discussed the matter with my professors. 
They evoked the argument about sovereignty of states. “But 
sovereignty of states,” I answered, “implies conducting an 
independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools, 
construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed towards 
the welfare of people. Sovereignty,” I argued, “cannot be conceived as 
the right to kill millions of innocent people.”141 
On the absolutist vision, sovereignty is an end—perhaps even 
the end, the “Letztbegründung (first principle)”142—of 
international legal order. This passage from Lemkin’s memoir 
suggests he held a radically different vision of sovereignty as 
means; the end is human welfare.143 
To make the move from sovereignty as end to 
sovereignty as human-serving means, one must accept both 
substantive limits on the freedom of states vis-à-vis their 
populations and mechanisms of accountability for states that 
exceed these limits.144 Barbarity, vandalism, and ultimately 
genocide thus acted as Lemkin’s tools in his effort to bound 
sovereignty, both substantively and with mechanisms of 
accountability. His approach to accountability centers on 
criminalization and prosecution. This prosecutorial approach 
reflects Lemkin’s own background in criminal law. In 1933, 
when he first proposed criminalizing barbarity and vandalism, 
Lemkin was working as a prosecutor, an instructor of 
comparative criminal law, and the Secretary General of the 
 
 140 See supra text accompanying note 98.  
 141 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 371 (emphasis added). 
 142 See Anne Peters, Humanity as the Α and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 513, 514-15 (2009) (arguing that humanity has ousted sovereignty as the first 
principle of international law, such that sovereignty “has a legal value only to the 
extent that it respects human rights, interests, and needs”); cf. Evan Criddle & Evan 
Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 347 (2009) 
(arguing that “a state’s claim to sovereignty, properly understood, relies on its 
fulfillment of a multifaceted and overarching fiduciary obligation to respect the agency 
and dignity of the people subject to state power”). 
 143 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, What Use for Sovereignty Today?, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L 
L. 61, 65 (2011) (“The general law for supreme sovereigns is this: Let the people’s 
welfare be the supreme law.” (quoting SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 
AND OF NATURE 737 (1672)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reisman, supra note 
103, at 40 (“[H]uman rights, most broadly understood, [should be] the major goal and 
the major justification of world order.”).  
 144 Cf. Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1150 n.61 (“Establishment of [an 
international court to prosecute genocide] would, of course, limit the nebulous concept 
of sovereignty.”).  
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Polish section of the International Association of Penal Law.145 
In his proposal—sent to the Madrid “Conference for the 
Unification of Penal Law”—Lemkin argues that barbarity and 
vandalism should be recognized as “offenses against the law of 
nations” subject to the “principle of universal repression,” under 
which they would be “prosecuted and punished independently of 
the place where the act was committed and of the nationality of 
the author.”146 Lemkin brings to genocide this focus on criminal 
prosecution147—mainly prosecution by other states,148 but he also 
raises the possibility of “trial by an international court” to be 
established for that purpose.149 Far from the view that 
sovereignty entails freedom even from external criticism, 
Lemkin envisions an international legal order in which states 
and the international community could—and should—prosecute 
officials of other states for (certain) domestic acts.150  
 
 145 See Vrdoljak, supra note 6, at 1175-77.  
 146 Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2 (proposed art. 7); see also 
Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 70 (“‘[U]niversal repression’ . . . makes the soil 
burn under the feet of . . . offenders” who try to flee.). The “principle of universal 
repression” is better known today as “universal jurisdiction.” See generally THE 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001). 
 147 See, e.g., LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 93 (“An international 
multilateral treaty should provide for the introduction, not only in the constitution but also 
in the criminal code of each country, of provisions protecting minority groups . . . . Each 
criminal code should have provisions inflicting penalties for genocide practices.”). 
 148 See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (“[T]he principle of universal repression should be 
adopted for the crime of genocide.”); Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 70 (same). 
 149 See Lemkin, Legal Case II, supra note 137, at 269 (“Allied military courts 
should conduct the trials.”); Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 43 (“[O]ffenders 
should be subject to trial by an international court.”). 
 150 Lemkin sometimes comments that genocide legitimizes “humanitarian 
intervention”—by which he means diplomatic objections. See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra 
note 53, at 146 & n.1, 150 (describing two diplomatic communications as instances of 
humanitarian intervention); Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2 (“diplomatic 
actions on behalf of the victims of such violations (humanitarian interventions)”); 
Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 71 (“[T]he organs of the United Nations will 
have the right to intervene or otherwise to express their concern.”).  
  Although discussions today about humanitarian intervention equate it with 
the use of military force, I have seen nothing in Lemkin’s published writings to suggest 
this is how he conceived it. Cf. POWER, supra note 9, at 58 (“[N]either the [Genocide 
Convention] nor [its] drafters discussed the use of force. It was a large enough leap to 
convince a state’s leaders to denounce or punish the crimes of a fellow state.”). Indeed, the 
only publication I have seen in which Lemkin may have addressed military intervention 
is the Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1148, 1149 n.54, which dismisses the 
“theoretical[]” possibility of the Security Council authorizing force to stop genocide as 
“negligible,” “difficult to conceive,” and “very unlikely.” On the other hand, in an 
unfinished manuscript, Lemkin briefly discusses humanitarian intervention in a way 
that suggests he shares Stowell’s view that intervention may take a variety of forms up to 
and including military force. See Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 60-66. 
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D. War, Peace, Crime, Punishment, and Lemkin’s Exigence 
Lemkin first published his new word after the Allies 
had begun to debate how to punish Axis leaders after the War. 
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had committed in the Moscow 
Declaration of 1943 to punish the “Hitlerite forces” responsible 
for “atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions.”151 
The Moscow Declaration specified that most perpetrators 
would be “judged and punished” in “the countries in which 
their abominable deeds were done,” while reserving to the 
Allies to “punish by joint decision” the Nazi leaders (i.e., those 
“German criminals whose offenses have no particular 
geographical localization”).152 
One key issue under debate was whether to punish 
atrocities committed by Germans in Germany against German 
citizens—notably, but not only, German Jews. As revelations 
about Nazi horrors emerged, Allied leaders declared their intent 
to punish those responsible, but these pronouncements often 
skirted what might be called the jurisdictional question. For 
example, in December 1942, soon after receiving Jan Karski’s 
report, the Allies “condemn[ed] in the strongest possible terms 
[the Nazis’] bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination” of 
Jews.153 Yet, this Joint Declaration was actually worded to focus 
only on crimes committed in “occupied countries”: 
[T]he German authorities, not content with denying to persons of 
Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has 
been extended, the most elementary human rights, are now carrying 
into effect Hitler’s oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish 
people in Europe. From all the occupied countries Jews are being 
transported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to 
Eastern Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi 
slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invader are 
being systematically emptied of all Jews . . . .154  
 
 151 Moscow Declaration, supra note 59, Statement on Atrocities. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Joint Declaration, Dec. 17, 1942, reprinted in 11 Allies Condemn Nazi War 
on Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1942, at 1. 
 154 Id.; see also Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 178, 184 (1946) (“[T]his statement, in its careful wording, is restricted to crimes 
committed . . . in . . . . occupied countries . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Other wartime documents reflect similar jurisdictional tensions. See generally 
SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 35-42. Schabas quotes the British Lord Chancellor, who 
distinguished between “atrocities committed against the Jews . . . . in occupied 
territories,” which “come within the territory of war crimes,” and similar acts 
“committed in enemy territory,” which “raise serious difficulties.” Id. at 37-38 (quoting 
UNWCC Doc. C.78, Feb. 15, 1945) (emphasis added).  
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After achieving Victory in Europe, the Allies met in 
London to negotiate what came to be known as the Nuremberg 
Charter.155 The Charter established an International Military 
Tribunal with jurisdiction over three crimes: crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.156 It defined 
the last, the most relevant here,157 as 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or 
during the war[,]158 or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.159  
In his landmark article on crimes against humanity, Egon 
Schwelb observes that the Charter’s definition “has, from the very 
beginning, caught the imagination of international lawyers.”160 
Phrases like “before or during the war,” “against any civilian 
population,” and “whether or not in violation of the domestic law 
of the country where perpetrated” appeared to herald a new 
balance between the international and the domestic.161  
Schwelb shows, however, that the promise of these 
phrases gave way to other language confining crimes against 
humanity to those acts taken “in execution of or in connection 
with any [other] crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,” 
namely, crimes against peace and war crimes.162 This language 
reflected the Allies’ decision in London to adopt a jurisdictional 
approach that “insisted upon a nexus between the war itself 
 
 155 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
 156 Id. art. 6. 
 157 Lemkin’s word is not found in the Nuremberg Charter, but his concept 
resonates with the Charter’s definition of crimes against humanity to such an extent as to 
allow the word itself to appear in the Nuremberg indictment: “They conducted deliberate 
and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the 
civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and 
classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and 
Gypsies and others.” Indictment of Hermann Goering, et al., Count 3, § VIII(a), (Oct. 6, 
1945) (emphasis added), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count.asp. The 
indictment’s mention of genocide pleased Lemkin. See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, 
supra note 7, at 367 (“I went to London and succeeded in having inscribed the charge of 
genocide against the Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg.”); see also Barrett, supra note 12, 
at 44-46.  
 158 This comma appeared in the original Russian text, but had been a semi-
colon in the original English and French texts. See infra note 165. 
 159 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 155, art. 6(c).  
 160 Schwelb, supra note 154, at 178. 
 161 See id. at 178-79. 
 162 See id. at 203-05, 218. 
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and the atrocities committed by the Nazis against their own 
Jewish populations.”163 The nexus requirement minimized the 
extent of the Charter’s jurisdictional innovation. The Allies 
sought not to rewrite the borders between the international and 
domestic but rather to extend the international modestly from 
established war crimes to similar crimes connected to the war 
effort—even if they occurred before the war began.164 The Allies 
later amended the Charter to bolster the nexus requirement.165 
In the end, the Nuremberg Tribunal found ample evidence of 
wartime crimes against humanity,166 but it concluded that the 
 
 163 SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 40. Schabas quotes Robert Jackson in London:  
It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government from time 
immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not 
ordinarily our business, that is to say, the way Germany treats its 
inhabitants . . . is not our affair any more than it is the affair of some other 
government to interpose itself in our problems. The reason that this program 
of extermination of Jews . . . becomes an international concern is this: it was 
a part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless we have a war connection 
as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no basis for dealing with 
atrocities. . . . We have some regrettable circumstances at times in our own 
country in which minorities are unfairly treated. 
Id. (quoting Report of Robert H. Jackson 331, 333 (1945)).  
 164 Schabas criticizes “Jackson’s narrow view,” id. at 41, once calling it 
“hypocritical.” See William Schabas, Semantics or Substance? David Scheffer’s Welcome 
Proposal to Strengthen Criminal Accountability for Atrocities, 2 GENOCIDE STUDIES & 
PREVENTION 31, 33 (2007). By contrast, Bassiouni argues that the Allies’ approach 
reflected a “trade-off . . . [intended] to strengthen the validity” of crimes against humanity 
by more firmly entwining the new crime with settled law. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 29-30 (2d rev. ed. 1999).  
 165 See Protocol Rectifying Discrepancy in the Charter, done at Berlin, Oct. 6, 
1945, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtprot.asp. The Charter definition of 
crimes against humanity had a semi-colon in the English and French texts, but a 
comma in Russian. The Allies agreed that “the Russian text is correct” and amended 
the punctuation in the other texts accordingly (while also making other changes to the 
French wording only). Id. Schwelb describes this change as having “considerable 
importance, inter alia, because it entails that the qualification contained in the second 
part of the paragraph, and expressed by the words ‘in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal’, refers to the whole text of 
Article 6(c).” Schwelb, supra note 154, at 188, 193-95.  
  Lemkin criticizes the punctuation change as “the rectification of an alleged 
error.” Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 148 (emphasis added). Roger Clark likewise 
expresses “the nagging doubt . . . that there had been a change of position.” See 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 164, at 29 (quoting Roger Clark, Crimes Against Humanity at 
Nuremberg, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 190-92 (George 
Ginsburgs & Vladimire Kudriavtsev eds., 1990)). Bassiouni argues, however, that the 
drafters “always intended” to apply the limiting words in the second part of the 
definition to the entire definition to effect the necessary “trade-off” discussed supra 
note 164. Id. at 29-30. 
 166 See “Persecution of the Jews” in Judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (1946), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/judcont.asp [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment] 
(holding that the Nazis had subjected Jews to “consistent and systematic inhumanity on 
the greatest scale”).  
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prosecutors largely failed to prove the necessary connections 
between prewar atrocities and the War.167  
Lemkin might have been expected to take some comfort 
from Nuremberg’s historic convictions of Nazi leaders 
responsible for the deaths of millions, including his own 
parents.168 In fact, however, the prosecutor Henry King recalls 
seeing Lemkin “very upset” a few days after the judgment: “He 
was concerned that the decision . . . did not go far enough in 
dealing with genocidal actions. This was because the [Tribunal] 
limited its judgment to wartime genocide and did not include 
peacetime genocide.”169 Lemkin explains, “From the point of 
view of international law, . . . acts committed before the war by 
Germany on its citizens were more significant. Had the 
Tribunal punished such acts a precedent would have been 
established to the effect that a Government is precluded from 
destroying groups of its own citizens.”170  
In his unpublished memoir, Lemkin adds, “For years, I 
tried to establish genocide as [an] international crime both in 
time of war and peace, and what I obtained in Nuremberg was 
 
 167 The Tribunal explained: 
The persecution of Jews [before the war started in 1939] is established 
beyond all doubt. . . . The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and 
horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved 
that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any [crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal]. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a 
general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity 
within the meaning of the Charter . . . . 
Id. at “The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”; see also 
International Law Commission, Principles of International Law Recognized in the 
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, principle VI 
(1950) (limiting its definition of crimes against humanity to acts “done . . . in execution 
of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime”). Although the 
Tribunal declined to make a “general declaration” linking prewar acts to the war, it did 
treat prewar acts in Austria and Sudetenland as crimes against humanity, finding that 
Germany had acquired control over those places through illegal acts of aggression. See 
Schwelb, supra note 154, at 204-05. 
 168 See POWER, supra note 9, at 49, 528 n.7 (“In Nuremberg [Lemkin] met up 
with his older brother, Elias; Elias’s wife; and their two sons. They told him that they 
were the family’s sole survivors. At least 49 others, including his parents, . . . had 
perished . . . .”). 
 169 Henry King, Genocide and Nuremberg, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS 29, 29 (Ralph 
Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007). But see Barrett, supra note 12, at 52-53 
(contending that Lemkin had left Nuremberg before the verdict and that King 
misremembered the timing in his essay written sixty years later). 
 170 Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 148; cf. Lemkin, Legal Case II, supra note 
137 (advocating trials “to clarify the standards by which international society can live”). 
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fragmentary treatment of the problem.”171 Lemkin considers 
Nuremberg’s outcome incomplete, because it penalized 
offenders already apprehended without “establish[ing] a rule of 
international law that would prevent and punish future crimes 
of the same type.”172 Because of the limitations of the wartime 
nexus requirement, Lemkin regards the Nuremberg approach 
as achieving only “‘an advance of 10 or 20 percent’ toward 
outlawing genocide.”173  
Lemkin’s exigence was bounding sovereignty. This 
entailed the necessity of establishing genocide as inherently a 
matter of international concern, always eligible for what might 
be termed “prosecutorial interference.” Lemkin wanted 
recognition that Germany’s mistreatment of its own citizens is 
“[c]learly . . . not Germany’s private concern.”174 To this end, he 
wanted Nuremberg to establish a “precedent . . . to the effect 
that a Government is precluded from destroying groups of its 
own citizens.”175 He could achieve his goal only if nations 
recognized genocide as a crime in peacetime, because nations 
 
 171 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 368; see also id. at 384 
(“[T]he purely juridical consequences of the [Nuremberg] trials were wholly 
insufficient . . . .”). 
 172 Id. at 384; cf. Schwelb, supra note 154, at 225-26 (concluding that “[t]he 
idea of external judicial interference within the area of exclusive domestic jurisdiction 
has certainly made some progress,” but is restricted in various ways such that “[t]he 
task of making the protection of human rights general, permanent, and effective still 
lies ahead”).  
 173 Anti-Genocide Gains Termed Significant, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1947, at 8 
[hereinafter Anti-Genocide Gains] (quoting Lemkin); cf. Yale Commentary, supra note 
31, at 1146 (“the legal impotence of Nuremberg”).  
  In discussing the limitations of Nuremberg (and Lemkin’s reactions 
thereto), I do not wish to unduly criticize it. Progress is often incremental, and the 
Nuremberg Charter surely “took a step forward in the form of a jurisdictional extension 
when it provided that the victims of the same types of conduct which constitutes war 
crimes, were protected without the requirement that they be of a different nationality 
than that of the perpetrators,” even with the requirement of a nexus to the war. 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 164, at 72. Bassiouni describes well the pressures and hurdles 
faced by the Allies, each with different interests and legal systems, as they established 
a novel mechanism capable of collectively adjudicating difficult issues in a short time; 
such an effort “necessarily requires political and legal compromises that may not be 
entirely sound.” Id. at 6-19. Bassiouni nicely conveys this perspective on Nuremberg 
with his epigraph from Machiavelli’s The Prince: “There is nothing more difficult to 
take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take 
the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.” Id. at 1.  
 174 Lemkin, Legal Case II, supra note 137, at 269. 
 175 Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 148; accord COOPER, supra note 31, at 72 
(quoting a letter Lemkin wrote to Trygve Lie on May 20, 1946, which predicted that 
“[a] precedent will be set [at Nuremberg] for the intervention in internal affairs of 
other countries on behalf of persecuted minorities”). 
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had always accepted international war as a matter of 
international concern.176  
Disappointed with the Nuremberg Tribunal, Lemkin 
turned to a different forum: the UN General Assembly. He 
“returned hastily . . . to New York and arranged, within a couple 
of days, that the governments of Cuba, India, and Panama 
sponsor [a] resolution [which Lemkin drafted] that genocide is a 
crime under international law, without any limitations to war or 
peace.”177 When the General Assembly passed a resolution against 
genocide, without any limitation to wartime,178 Lemkin exulted in 
the triumph of his concept over absolutist sovereignty: “[B]y 
making [genocide] a problem of international concern, . . . the 
resolution . . . changes fundamentally the . . . responsibilities of a 
government toward its citizens.”179 The Genocide Convention, in 
turn, expressly declares genocide an international crime regardless 
“whether committed in time of peace or in time of war.”180 
Nuremberg thus played a dual role in Lemkin’s 
rhetorical project. It clearly marked an historic step toward 
international criminal accountability for perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity (including, for this purpose, genocide). Yet its 
limitations also spurred Lemkin to pursue—and the United 
 
 176 The concept of peacetime genocide runs through Lemkin’s writings. See, 
e.g., LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiii (advocating a treaty to prohibit 
“extermination attempts and oppression in time of peace”); id. at 93 (“genocide is a 
problem not only of war but also of peace”); Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 
42; Raphael Lemkin, Genocide, 15 AM. SCHOLAR 227, 230 (1946) [hereinafter Lemkin, 
Genocide] (specifying that a treaty must “provid[e] for [genocide’s] prevention and 
punishment in time of peace and war”). Although the peacetime theme originates in 
Axis Rule, it had not yet become the priority later evidenced by Lemkin’s criticisms of 
Nuremberg. This treatise, after all, focuses on Axis rule “in Occupied Europe.” It 
concerns German occupation practices, not domestic policies. Even its chapter on 
persecution of Jews is, like the Allies’ Joint Declaration, limited to “Jews in the 
occupied countries.” See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 77. 
 177 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 368. 
 178 See G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13. The final resolution exceeds Lemkin’s 
draft, which did not definitively declare genocide to be an international crime and a 
subject of international concern, but only called for a study and “a report on the 
possibilities” of such a declaration. See U.N. Doc. A/BUR/50, reprinted in 1 THE 
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 3 (Hirad Abtahi & Philippa 
Webb eds., 2008) [hereinafter THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION]. 
 179 Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 150; see also Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra 
note 7, at 70 (“From [the resolution] follows a most important consequence: the 
destruction of [listed] groups is no longer an internal affair of the country involved but 
a matter of international concern.”); Anti-Genocide Gains, supra note 173, at 8 (quoting 
Lemkin as describing the resolution as “a real revolution in international law, in that it 
tries to reconcile the interests of all human beings everywhere with the principle of 
sovereignty”); Yale Commentary, supra note 31, at 1156 (“In contemplating eventual 
international court jurisdiction over individuals in time of peace, the genocide treaty 
introduces a completely new international law concept.”). 
 180 Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. I. 
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Nations to make—a clearer assertion that genocide is inherently 
and always a matter of international concern.181 Lemkin’s 
reaction to Nuremberg both confirms the central importance of 
sovereignty-bounding to his exigence and illustrates one key 
aspect of the norm he sought to impose: genocide is a crime 
warranting punishment in both war and peace. 
E. Genocide as Boundary 
If Lemkin means genocide to bound sovereignty, the 
next question is exactly what boundary he intends to draw.  
From the start, Lemkin’s conception of genocide concerned 
the destruction of groups. Lemkin insists that this focus 
distinguishes genocide from “inadequate” preexisting concepts 
like “denationalization” and “Germanization.”182 Although some 
details shift as Lemkin’s word moves from conception to 
Convention, his emphasis always remains on groups. 
For Lemkin, “mass killing” is one “technique” of 
genocide.183 It is not synonymous with genocide and is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to constitute genocide.184 Rather, 
Lemkin describes a variety of other techniques for pursuing 
genocide: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, 
physical, religious, and moral.185 Mass killing only qualifies as 
 
 181 See Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, For Punishment of Genocide, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1947, at L24 (“The Nuremberg judgment decided that crimes 
against humanity are punishable only when committed during a war of aggression. For 
punishing the destruction of human groups in time of peace another legal machinery 
had to be sought.”); Raphael Lemkin, War Against Genocide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
MAG., Jan. 31, 1948, at 2 (“[T]he crimes established in Nuremberg apply only in 
relationship between a conqueror and a conquered country. Crimes applicable in time 
of peace, in relations among sovereign states, are a completely different matter.”); see 
also SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 642 (“If the law of Nuremberg had recognized what 
Raphael Lemkin called ‘peacetime genocide’, there would probably have been no 
General Assembly resolution and no Convention. Neither would have been necessary. 
There would have been no . . . gap to fill.”). 
 182 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79-80 (criticizing words that failed to 
capture the “destruction of the biological structure” of the target group). Lemkin also 
faults “Germanization,” “Italianization,” and “Magyarization” for failing to establish 
“the common elements of one generic notion . . . .” Id. at 80. 
 183 Id. at 88-89.  
 184 See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 147 (“Mass murder or 
extermination wouldn’t apply in the case of sterilization.”); Lemkin, Modern Crime, 
supra note 136, at 39 (“[T]he term [genocide] does not necessarily signify mass killings 
although it may mean that. More often it refers to a coordinated plan aimed at 
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups so that these 
groups wither and die like plants that have suffered a blight.”). 
 185 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 82-90. Lemkin distinguishes between 
biological and physical techniques. The former focuses on reducing the birth rate of the 
target group (e.g., by separating men and women) and increasing that of the dominant 
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genocide when it “aim[s] at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups.”186 Lemkin thus 
conceives of genocide not as murder, but—by analogy to 
murder—as the destruction of a group.187  
By treating mass killing as a technique of genocide, 
Lemkin shows that his exigence focuses on peoples more than 
persons. Lemkin displays this group focus throughout his work. 
As early as his Madrid proposal in 1933, Lemkin argues for 
criminalizing barbarity on the ground that: 
The goal of the [perpetrator] is not only to harm an individual, but, 
also to cause damage to the collectivity to which the later belongs. 
Offenses of this type bring harm not only to human rights, but also 
and most especially they undermine the fundemental [sic] basis of 
the social order.188  
For Lemkin, then, the harm to groups both distinguishes 
barbarity from other offenses and makes it an appropriate 
subject of international concern. His concern was “most 
especially” with “social order” rather than “human rights.”  
Lemkin carries this group focus into his work on 
genocide, which “is directed against the national group as an 
entity, and the actions involved are directed against 
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of 
 
group (e.g., by subsidizing procreation), while the latter involves causing physical harm 
to individual members of the target group. Id. at 86-89. Lemkin identifies mass killing 
as one of three physical techniques, together with “[r]acial [d]iscrimination in [f]eeding” 
and “[e]ndangering of [h]ealth.” Id. at 87-89.  
 186 Id. at 79. 
 187 See Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 229 (arguing that criminalizing 
genocide implies that “every national, racial and religious group has a natural right of 
existence,” as homicide does for individuals). Lemkin displays a tendency to describe 
groups in anthropomorphic terms: they have a “life,” a “biological structure,” and a 
“natural right of existence.” Id.; see also supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. He 
praises a draft of the Convention for treating “[t]he human group . . . as a living entity.” 
Lemkin, War Against Genocide, supra note 181. Accordingly, A. Dirk Moses describes 
Lemkin’s concept as “groupism, . . . the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and 
races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed, that is, to 
regard them as internally homogenous, external bounded groups, even unitary 
collective actors with common purposes.” A. Dirk Moses, Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and 
the Concept of Genocide, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENOCIDE STUDIES 19, 22 
(Donald Bloxham & A. Dirk Moses eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK] 
(quoting Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups, in FACING ETHNIC CONFLICTS: 
TOWARDS A NEW REALISM 35 (Andreas Wimmer et al. eds., 2004)) (internal punctuation 
omitted). Moses further locates Lemkin in the traditions of “Polish romantic 
nationalists,” who “belie[ved] in the unique role of each people in the ‘symphony of 
nations’”; Jewish Bundists, who “believed in multiethnic states with minority 
protection”; and liberal imperialists, who supported imperialism as long as it served 
the goal of civilization, but opposed extreme violence. Id. at 23-28. 
 188 Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 5. 
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the national group.”189 He argues for prohibiting genocide to fill 
a gap in the Hague Regulations,190 which “are silent regarding 
the preservation of the integrity of a people.”191 He points to 
rising “interest in national groups as distinguished from states 
and individuals” in the recent “evolution of international law” 
and thus situates his word with the interwar concern for 
protecting minority groups.192 
In the opening passage of Axis Rule’s chapter on 
genocide, Lemkin identifies four possible groups capable of 
being victimized by genocide: nations, ethnic groups, races, and 
tribes.193 He later adds religions194 and tends to omit tribes. He 
sees these groups as special, writing in an unpublished 
manuscript that they are “based on the formula of the human 
cosmos. This cosmos consists of four basic groups: national, 
racial, religious and ethnic.”195  
The common thread among Lemkin’s groups is culture. 
He seeks to protect those groups he sees as creators and 
preservers of culture, “the spiritual resources of mankind.”196 He 
evidences his concern for culture as early as his 1933 proposal to 
outlaw vandalism, the “destruction of the culture and works of 
art.”197 Cultural concerns persist in Lemkin’s work on genocide. 
Axis Rule states: “[N]ations are essential elements of the world 
community. The world represents only so much culture and 
intellectual vigor as are created by its component national 
 
 189 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79. 
 190 Lemkin refers to the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, annexed to Hague Convention (IV) of 1907. See id. at 14 n.17. 
 191 Id. at 90. 
 192 See id. at 90-91 (referencing the Treaty of Versailles, “specific minority 
treaties,” and constitutions and penal codes promulgated after 1918); Lemkin, Modern 
Crime, supra note 136, at 43 (associating his project with “[t]he principle of the 
international protection of minorities . . . proclaimed by post-Versailles minority 
treaties,” while criticizing those treaties as “inadequate” in several respects); see also 
supra notes 114, 147. 
 193 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79. 
 194 See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 228 (“national, racial or 
religious groups”). 
 195 Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 1; cf. Lemkin, War Against 
Genocide, supra note 181 (“In its essential ideological and biological foundations, the 
history of mankind is centered more around the human group (genos) than around the 
state . . . .”).  
 196 Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 1. 
 197 Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 7. Lemkin elaborates: “An 
attack targeting a collectivity can also take the form of systematic and organized 
destruction of the art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and 
achievement of a collectivity are revealed . . . .” Id. 
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groups. . . . The destruction of a nation, therefore, results in the 
loss of its future contributions to the world . . . .”198 
Lemkin later elaborates, by force of example: 
Cultural considerations speak for international protection of national, 
religious and cultural groups. Our whole heritage is a product of the 
contributions of all nations. We can best understand this when we 
realize how impoverished our culture would be if the peoples doomed 
by Germany, such as the Jews, had not been permitted to create the 
Bible, or to give birth to an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not 
had the opportunity to give to the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a 
Curie; the Czechs, a Huss, a Dvorak; the Greeks, a Plato and a 
Socrates; the Russians, a Tolstoy and a Shostakovich.199 
Lemkin captures the heart of his idea with the words 
“[g]enocide is essentially an ethnico-cultural concept.”200  
This “ethnico-cultural” conception of genocide explains 
various aspects of Lemkin’s approach. It explains why he 
believes mass killings do not constitute genocide absent 
targeting a protected group.201 It explains why he omits political, 
social, and other groups from his list of protected groups.202 It 
explains the breadth of techniques—especially cultural 
techniques, like destroying museums and libraries or restricting 
artists and musicians—he deems capable of effecting genocide.203 
 
 198 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 91. 
 199 Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 228.  
 200 Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, For Punishment of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 1947, at L24. Lemkin used the same phrase in a letter to Sir Hartley 
Shawcross on July 8, 1947. See COOPER, supra note 31, at 94-95. Similarly, in a letter 
to Eleanor Roosevelt in 1946, Lemkin described genocide as “a term I coined for the 
concept of killing nations and obliterating their cultures.” Id. at 51 (quoting Lemkin). 
 201 See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 147 (“[M]ass murder does not 
convey the specific losses to civilization in the form of the cultural contributions which 
can be made only by groups of people united through national, racial or cultural 
characteristics.”).  
 202 In this regard, Lemkin often discusses Jews, Roma, and Slavs as victims of 
Nazi genocide. See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227; Lemkin, War 
Against Genocide, supra note 181. By contrast, I see no mention in his 1944-1948 
writings of such other victim groups as the disabled and homosexuals. These groups 
generally received little attention in the early years after the war. See, e.g., Nuremberg 
Indictment, supra note 157, Count 3 (charging genocide against “Jews, Poles, and 
Gypsies and others”); Dorthe Seifert, Between Silence and License: The Representation 
of the National Socialist Persecution of Homosexuality in Anglo-American Fiction and 
Film, 15 HIST. & MEMORY 94, 94 (2003) (“Public knowledge and awareness of the 
persecution of homosexuality in National Socialist Germany remained limited until 
1979 . . . .”). Even with knowledge, however, Lemkin might well have considered these 
groups beyond his “ethnico-cultural concept[ion]” of genocide. Cf. SCHABAS, supra note 
15, at 153-71 (arguing that violence targeting these groups, among others, should be 
regarded as crimes against humanity but not genocide).  
 203 See, e.g., LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 84-85; Lemkin, War Against 
Genocide, supra note 181 (arguing that it is “especially important” to protect “houses of 
worship, objects of religious cult, schools, treasures of art and culture” because 
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F. Other Exigences 
Advocates often must persuade the audience that there 
is a problem in need of a solution. This is “often . . . the most 
fundamental exigence faced by advocates,” because “[i]nertia is 
a powerful force in human affairs.”204 
Lemkin failed at this task in Madrid in 1933. He could 
not persuade his audience that barbarity and vandalism 
presented sufficient risks to warrant adding them to the short 
list of international crimes.205 For genocide to succeed where its 
predecessors had failed, Lemkin had to show the audience that 
genocide was a real and recurring phenomenon.206 Even the 
horrors of the Holocaust might not have sufficed to criminalize 
genocide if the international community had perceived Nazi 
atrocities as a unique, isolated instance unlikely to be 
repeated.207 In presenting his word, therefore, Lemkin takes care 
both to associate it with the compelling, contemporaneous case 
of the Nazis and to establish a pattern of genocide dating back to 
antiquity. Axis Rule describes genocide as a “new word . . . to 
denote an old practice in its modern development.”208 In another 
article, Lemkin quotes Hitler’s statement that “[i]n former days 
it was the victor’s prerogative to destroy tribes, entire peoples” 
and then responds, strikingly, “Hitler was right.”209  
 
“[r]eligion can be destroyed within a group even if the members of the group continue 
to subsist physically”). 
 204 See supra notes 89-93.  
 205 See POWER, supra note 9, at 21-23 (quoting one delegate who thought 
barbarity happened “too seldom to legislate”). 
 206 Cf. Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 68 (“Only experiences, and in 
this particular field we are sorry to say, only great disasters, can convince nations to 
give up more of their sovereignty in order to achieve bigger international goals.”). 
 207 See, e.g., Lemkin, War Against Genocide, supra note 181 (“The Soviet 
delegate argued ‘genocide was committed only by the Nazis; since Germany is 
destroyed, there is no more danger of genocide.’”). 
 208 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79. To illustrate his claim that genocide 
dates to antiquity, Lemkin lists “[t]he most widely known cases of genocide” before Hitler: 
the destruction of Carthage, the destruction of the Albigenses and Waldenses, 
the Crusades, the march of the Teutonic Knights, the destruction of the 
Christians under the Ottoman Empire, the massacres of the Herreros in 
Africa, the extermination of the Armenians, the slaughter of the Christian 
Assyrians in 1933, the destruction of the Maronites, and the pogroms against 
the Jews in Czarist Russia and Rumania.  
Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7. 
 209 Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 39. Lemkin and Hitler part 
ways (of course) about whether past events constitute precedents to be followed or 
crimes to be condemned.  
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Lemkin’s challenge, then, was to establish among the 
countless incidences of humanity’s inhumanity a recurring 
subset deserving of criminalization. The preexisting words 
barbarity and vandalism had failed to reveal a sufficient 
pattern. Lemkin coined his word to help the international 
community see old crimes in new ways.210 
Likewise, advocates often must persuade the audience to 
care about the problem. It is not enough to establish the 
existence of a problem, even a recurring problem. The problem 
must be important—worthy of a claim on the audience’s 
attention, empathy, energy, resources, and time.211 And the 
advocate must meet this burden not in a vacuum, but in a world 
filled with other problems making competing claims on the 
audience. In short, the advocate must overcome indifference. 
Neville Chamberlain exemplifies indifference in his 
infamous description of Hitler’s threat to Czechoslovakia as “a 
quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we 
know nothing.”212 Elie Wiesel describes eloquently the “perils of 
indifference”: 
Indifference . . . is more dangerous than anger and hatred. Anger can 
at times be creative. One writes a great poem, a great symphony, 
[does] something special for the sake of humanity because one is 
angry at the injustice that one witnesses. But indifference is never 
creative. . . . Indifference is not a response.  
 
 210 In this regard, Jasinski discusses the scholarly literature on the ways 
language and “social knowledge” help to “make the world visible.” See JASINSKI, supra 
note 67, at 185, 525. Naming a phenomenon can help humans to recognize and 
understand it. See id. at 120. It is social knowledge, for example, that helps a viewer to 
see a series of physical movements by individuals as a play conducted by a football 
team. See id. at 120, 525. Of course, depending on the name and definition selected, 
they may serve to mystify rather than clarify. See id. at 120, 185, 378. 
 211 Cf. Bitzer, Functional Communication, supra note 74, at 32 (“An exigence 
will generate more interest if its likely consequences are numerous and of great 
significance . . . .”). 
 212 See Neville Chamberlain, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Neville_ 
Chamberlain (quoting Prime Minister on the Issues, TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 1938, at 
10). Chamberlain’s quotation centers on the problem of indifference across national 
borders, but humanity must also struggle against borders of “race, color, or creed”:  
When Claude Lanzmann was filming Shoah, he asked a Polish peasant 
whose fields abutted a death camp what he felt when he saw human ash from 
the crematoria chimneys raining down on his fields. The peasant replied: 
“When I cut my finger, I feel it. When you cut your finger, you feel it.”  
Michael Ignatieff, Lemkin’s Word: The Danger of a World Without Enemies, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 25. 
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Indifference is not a beginning, it is an end. And, therefore, 
indifference . . . benefits the aggressor—never his victim, whose pain 
is magnified when he or she feels forgotten.213 
Wiesel concludes that indifference denies the victims’ 
humanity and thus “betray[s] our own.”214 His speech recalls 
John Donne’s famous lines: “No man is an island, entire of 
itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the 
main. . . . Any man’s death diminishes me because I am 
involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for 
whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”215 
Lemkin sought a word able to toll a bell for mankind. He 
wanted “THE WORD” to convey “MORAL JUDGEMENT.”216 He 
wanted genocide “to chill listeners and invite immediate 
condemnation.”217 Indeed, the heart of Lemkin’s project was to 
establish genocide as “a matter of international concern.”218 
Where “[i]ndifference . . . is an end,” concern is a start. 
Lemkin offers many reasons to care about genocide. 
Prominent among them are the cultural losses genocide inflicts 
on all humanity.219 More broadly, Lemkin argues that 
genocide’s targeting of groups jeopardizes “social order”220 and 
“the very moral and legal foundations of constitutional 
government” everywhere.221  
 
 213 Elie Wiesel, The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned from a Violent 
Century, Remarks at the White House (Apr. 12, 1999) (transcript available at 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/First_Lady/html/generalspeeches/1999/19990412.html).  
 214 Id. 
 215 Bassiouni aptly quotes these lines as the epigraph to the first edition of his 
book. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW, at X (1992). 
 216 POWER, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting Lemkin’s handwritten notes). 
 217 Id. 
 218 G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13 (emphasis added).  
 219 See supra Part III.E; cf. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (Prosecutor v. Krstic), 
Case No. ICTY-98-33-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 36 (Apr. 19, 2004) (Genocide “deprive[s] 
humanity of the manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions 
provide. This is a crime against all of humankind, its harm being felt not only by the 
group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity.”). 
 220  See supra text accompanying note 188. 
 221 Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 42-43 (allowing genocide in one 
country threatens “the very moral and legal foundations of constitutional government” 
everywhere, because all states have “[m]inorities of one sort or another” who depend on 
“the constitutional order of the state” for protection). Lemkin adds several other reasons 
for concern about genocide, including: tolerating internal aggression invites external 
aggression, id.; internal disturbances, especially “[a]rbitrary and wholesale confiscations” 
of property, disrupt the conditions needed for international trade, id.; and oppression of 
minority groups “result[s] in international disturbances, especially in the form of 
disorganized emigration of the persecuted,” LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 93.  
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IV. COMPLETING LEMKIN’S SITUATION 
A. Lemkin’s Audience 
In the summer of 1942, the U.S. Board of Economic 
Warfare retained Lemkin as a consultant.222 His unfinished 
autobiography reports: “In my agency, I found complete 
unawareness that the Axis planned destruction of the people 
under their control. My first attempts to educate my office were 
discouraging. The problem I tried to bring up appeared too 
theoretical and even fantastic to them.”223 Lemkin felt similarly 
frustrated when President Roosevelt rejected his proposal for 
the urgent negotiation of a treaty to “make genocide a crime—
the crime of crimes”—and counseled “patience” instead.224 The 
need to educate, to make the full import of Nazi actions less 
fantastic and more urgent, underpins Axis Rule.225 In particular, 
Lemkin sought to educate “the Anglo-Saxon reader, who, with 
his innate respect for human rights and human personality, may 
be inclined to believe that the Axis régime could not possibly be 
as cruel and ruthless as it has been hitherto described.”226 
Axis Rule, as noted already, consists largely of a country-
by-country litany of German actions in nineteen occupied 
territories, supported by English translations of key laws.227 This 
is preceded by a shorter “synthesis,”228 which ends with a chapter 
titled “Genocide.”229 This structure evidences Lemkin’s intent to 
encapsulate in a single, understandable word the essence of all 
the Nazi actions catalogued through the rest of the book.230 It is 
 
 222 See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 382. 
 223 Id. at 382-83.  
 224 Id. at 383.  
 225 Cf. Samantha Power, Introduction to LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at iii, 
iv (“With Axis Rule, Lemkin set out to make the unbelievable believable.”). I do not 
suggest that Lemkin was moved to write Axis Rule by his experiences in Washington, as 
he had started writing it in Sweden in 1940. See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xiv. 
But those experiences in Washington must have shaped the way Lemkin finished the 
book, and the memoir passage reflects a determination to educate people about the true 
nature of Nazi rule, which must have driven Lemkin throughout his work on Axis Rule. 
Indeed, Power points to a different passage in the memoir to suggest that Axis Rule may 
have been motivated by Lemkin’s frustration that so many Jews stayed in occupied 
Poland, because they could not see that Nazi rule would be so much worse than the 
pogroms they had endured until then. See Power, Introduction, supra, at iii, iv. 
 226 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at ix. 
 227 See supra Part I.B. 
 228 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at ix. 
 229 Id. at 79. 
 230 Cf. Henry Bernhardt, Book Review, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 521, 523 (1945) (“The 
author’s presentation culminates in his discussion of ‘genocide,’” where “he succeeds in 
showing the Germans at their worst.”); Ignatieff, supra note 212, at 26 (“Lemkin was 
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the forest, the rest trees. It reveals the pattern, which informs 
all the details but might be lost among them.231 A generic word 
like “denationalization” or a case-specific word like 
“Germanization” would not do, because neither could make 
visible to the audience the true nature of the Nazi regime.  
Lemkin says in his unfinished autobiography that he 
wrote Axis Rule to “appeal directly to the American people” 
rather than “rely[ing] on statesmen alone.”232 This seems 
implausible. Axis Rule is 674 pages long, dense, and difficult.233 
A book review in the New York Times does a better job than 
Lemkin himself of capturing his audience: 
[Axis Rule] is . . . a technical legal treatise and a source and 
reference work . . . . It will prove an indispensable handbook for 
scholars and historians and for those authorities of the [Allies] 
charged with undoing, as far as possible, the effects of Axis 
domination. But in a sense it is a pity that its nature precludes a 
larger audience for this book. For out of its dry legalism there 
emerge the contours of the monster that now bestrides the earth.234 
This review thus identifies a limited audience that includes, 
importantly, Allied governments. Other reviews likewise note 
the book’s value to readers responsible for “the making of plans 
 
the first scholar to work out the logic of [Nazi] jurisprudence . . . . [T]he wholesale 
extermination of groups was not an accidental or incidental cruelty . . . . It was the very 
essence of the occupation . . . .”). 
 231 The preface seems to confirm this reading of genocide’s significance in the 
book’s structure. There, Lemkin introduces each chapter of Part I in order, but inserts 
the following before Chapter IX: 
The picture of coordinated German techniques of occupation must lead to the 
conclusion that the German occupant has embarked upon a gigantic scheme 
to change, in favor of Germany, the balance of biological forces between it and 
the captive nations for many years to come. The objective of this scheme is to 
destroy or to cripple the subjugated peoples . . . . The practice of 
extermination of nations and ethnic groups as carried out by the invaders is 
called by the author ‘genocide’ . . . . 
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at xi. This passage suggests that the first eight 
chapters depict a “gigantic scheme” to destroy subjugated peoples, while Chapter IX 
names that scheme. 
 232 See Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 383. 
 233 Luban describes it as “an obscure, largely unread, and nearly unreadable 
law book.” See Luban, supra note 26, at 307. 
 234 Otto D. Tolischus, Twentieth-Century Moloch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1945, at 
1; accord Thornton Terhune, Book Review, 20 TUL. L. REV. 153, 153 (1945) (“This book, 
albeit an excellent one, is definitely not for the casual reader . . . .”). But see Ramsay 
Moran, Book Review, 31 VA. L. REV. 730, 733 (1945) (“[T]his work is not intended for 
use by legal scholars alone; it is not technical in its language or in the few personal 
conclusions of its author. It is, rather, a sober presentation of facts which should 
become more widely known to the American people . . . .”).  
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for restoration and reparation.”235 In other words, the audience 
includes the very people with whom Lemkin worked and 
interacted in the U.S. government. Indeed, Axis Rule was 
published in Washington, D.C., by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, an influential think tank.236  
As Lemkin strove to embed genocide into the law as a 
limit on sovereignty, government officials remained at the core 
of his audience. In late 1944, “an advance copy of” Axis Rule 
circulated “[i]nside the War Department,” where Lemkin’s 
“description of Nazism as organised criminality became a basis 
for the plan . . . to try Nazi leaders and their organizations 
before an international tribunal for the crime of conspiracy.”237 
Two days after Justice Jackson’s appointment as chief U.S. 
negotiator for what became the Nuremberg Charter, Lemkin 
wrote to call his attention to Axis Rule.238 Lemkin went on to 
work for Jackson’s team. He met with prosecutors, drafters, 
negotiators, and decision-makers in Geneva, London, New 
York, Nuremberg, Paris, and Washington.239 And he worked the 
halls of the United Nations.240  
Lemkin also appealed to constituencies likely to 
influence his ultimate audience, such as foreign-policy elites, 
international lawyers, and liberal intellectuals. His writings at 
this time appeared in publications read by such an audience, 
including the American Journal of International Law, 
American Scholar, Christian Science Monitor,241 Free World,242 
 
 235 Arthur Kuhn, Book Review, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 360, 361 (1945) (“source-
material of inestimable value in the making of plans for restoration and reparation, as 
well as for the practitioner and the historian”); accord Merle Fainsod, Book Review, 58 
HARV. L. REV. 744, 744 (1945) (“source material for [a history of the Axis occupation]”); 
id. at 746 (“those charged with the responsibility of disentangling the spider web of 
Axis legislation”); Moran, supra note 234, at 733 (“a great amount of material from 
which indictments . . . can be drafted”). 
 236 The director of the Carnegie Endowment’s international law division 
describes Axis Rule in terms that reveal an audience of policy-makers: “a contribution 
toward the restoration of peace based upon justice,” which “gives in readily accessible 
form in the English language the basic documents and essential factual information 
from authentic sources that will be urgently needed when the process starts of 
untangling the spider web of Axis legislation.” George Finch, Foreword, in LEMKIN, 
AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at vii, viii. 
 237 See Barrett, supra note 12, at 38. 
 238 Id. at 36-37. 
 239 See POWER, supra note 9, at 27, 49-60. 
 240 See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at A31. 
 241 An editor’s “inside” account of the Monitor, dated 1958, describes it in 
terms that suggest its appeal to Lemkin. It had a large circulation among 
governmental elites in the United States and “120 lands”; the U.S. Government often 
distributed excerpts to foreign news services; it was “read carefully on Capitol Hill,” 
where “legislators introduce[d] material from the Monitor with great frequency in the 
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and the United Nations Bulletin. Lemkin likewise cultivated the 
media. Journalists recount stories of Lemkin’s constant efforts: 
“he would run after [journalists], tie flopping in the air, genocide 
story at the ready.”243 Weeks after Axis Rule was published, 
Lemkin persuaded the publisher of the Washington Post to run 
the world’s first editorial about genocide.244 He published letters 
to the editor in the New York Times.245 And he made certain to 
credit the media for their leadership on the issue.246 
B. Lemkin’s Constraints 
Like many advocates of major policy changes, Lemkin 
had to navigate countless constraints. Many of his constraints 
are obvious: the war, its aftermath, and the start of the Cold 
War; a fledgling United Nations, not yet even located at its 
permanent headquarters; favorable but unspecific language on 
human rights in the UN Charter,247 proclaimed in apparent 
 
Congressional Record, usually with a pleasant compliment”; it was “widely subscribed 
to by libraries, universities, institutions, public officials, offices, organizations, 
professional men” and “read by more newspapermen than any other”; and it “may well 
[have been] the most widely quoted newspaper in the world.” See ERWIN D. CANHAM, 
COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, at xiii-
xxiii, 396-403 (1958). 
 242 Free World magazine was published monthly in New York from late 1941 to 
1946 by a group of “well-known intellectuals and political figures” with a “liberal and 
international outlook.” Helmut Pfanner, The Contributions by German and Austrian Exiles 
in Free World Magazine, TRANS INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN, 
http://www.inst.at/trans/15Nr/05_02/pfanner15.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). A 
“preponderance” of its essays concerned the war and “the general threat of totalitarianism to 
free humanity.” Famous names on its “honorary board” included Albert Einstein, Fiorello 
LaGuardia, Thomas Mann, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Id. Free World published works by such 
familiar figures as Charles de Gaulle, Ernest Hemingway, Eleanor Roosevelt, Bertrand 
Russell, Carl Sandburg, Henry Wallace, and Orson Welles, as well as many European 
émigrés. Id. 
 243 POWER, supra note 9, at 51 (quoting Kathleen Teltsch of the New York 
Times); see also id. at 52 (quoting A.M. Rosenthal, “I don’t remember how I met 
[Lemkin], but I remember I was always meeting him.”). 
 244 See id. at 44 (discussing Genocide, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1944). 
 245 See Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, Genocide Before the U.N., N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1946, at C22; Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, For Punishment of 
Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1947, at L24. 
 246 See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 149 n.10 (“An important factor in 
the comparatively quick reception of the concept of genocide in international law was 
the understanding and support of this idea by the press of the United States and other 
countries,” listing “[e]specially remarkable contributions” by eight newspapers in four 
countries); Elder, supra note 34, at 485 (quoting Lemkin crediting “the UN 
correspondents who ‘did the most remarkable job in explaining the complicated issue to 
the world’”).  
 247 See U.N. Charter pmbl. (“human rights, . . . dignity and worth of the 
human person,” “tolerance,” “economic and social advancement of all peoples”); id. art. 
1, para. 1 (“principles of justice and international law”); id. art. 1, para. 2 (“equal rights 
and self-determination of people”); id. art. 1, para. 3 (“human rights 
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tension with language on nonintervention,248 neither yet 
elaborated with experience;249 “realist” doubts about the utility 
of a treaty outlawing genocide; and Lemkin’s lack of funding 
and institutional support.250 
The most fundamental constraint upon Lemkin flows 
from the very nature of international law. States are the 
dominant actors in making and changing international law. 
State consent is sometimes regarded as the sine qua non of 
international legal obligation; in the words of the Lotus Court, 
“The rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their 
own free will . . . .”251 Even if the Lotus formulation is overstated, 
it remains clear that state consent plays a vital role in the 
creation of international legal obligation—most obviously in the 
case of treaties, but also custom and general practices.252 Lemkin 
could not hope to succeed in bounding sovereignty with genocide 
except with the support of many states. Yet, states are 
inherently self-interested in conceptions of sovereignty broad 
enough to shield themselves from unwanted outside 
interference.253 This tension permeated Lemkin’s situation.254 
Last, the basic need to convey his “[n]ew conception[]” to 
other humans also acted as a constraint on Lemkin. He 
concluded that he needed a “new term[].”255 In this, Lemkin was 
 
and . . . fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion”); id. art. 55 (“universal respect for, and observance of,” same); id. art. 56 
(pledging “joint and separate action” to achieve “the purposes set forth in Article 55”). 
Articles 13(1)(b), 62(2), and 68 empower the General Assembly and Economic and 
Social Council to make commissions, studies, and recommendations to promote human 
rights. For an example of Lemkin appealing to the Charter’s principles, see Lemkin, 
Genocide, supra note 176, at 228. 
 248 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . ; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”). 
 249 See generally Buergenthal, supra note 114, at 785-91 (explaining how the 
“intentionally vague Charter provisions on human rights” gained significance through 
UN practice, including the “gradual[] reject[ion] by a majority of the UN membership” 
of objections based on Article 2(7)). 
 250 See POWER, supra note 9, at 52-60, 77-78. 
 251 The Lotus, supra note 104, at 18.  
 252 See generally Jutta Brunée, Consent, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCL. PUB. INT’L 
L., supra note 120.  
 253 Cf. Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 61 (“[T]he enforcement of 
international law is entrusted . . . to the very government most interested in the 
pursuit of national policies.”). 
 254 See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 212 (“It was clear that the issue [of 
cultural genocide] had hit a nerve with several countries who were conscious of 
problems with their own policies towards minority groups . . . .”); cf. SCHABAS, supra 
note 15 (discussing similar concerns at the London Conference). 
 255 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79; see also Lemkin, Introduction, 
supra note 123, at 24-25 (“New words are always created when a social phenomenon 
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governed by semantics, defined by Michel Bréal as “the laws 
that preside over the transformation of meaning, the choice of 
new expressions, the birth and death of locutions.”256 Language 
is a social institution.257 Accordingly, would-be neologists are 
constrained by the need to ensure their innovations are 
intelligible to the audience. Brigitte Nerlich explains, 
[T]he individual will is free, we can choose and innovate, but we are 
not pre-eminent, we cannot act autocratically over language. Our 
freedom has certain limits. The constraints on the democratic 
process of word-making are . . . the already existing material and 
usages of speech and most importantly the already existing 
analogies, the preferred models of language-making.258 
Lemkin seems to acknowledge this constraint, conceding that 
the “individual creator” only succeeds at propagating a new 
word “if, and in so far as, it meets popular needs and tastes.”259 
We have already seen that Lemkin faced the burdens of 
establishing that he had identified a real, recurring, and 
 
strikes at our conscience with great force . . . . [L]ike poetry they are essentially the 
reply of man to a social need.”). Thomas Jefferson expressed the same idea, albeit in a 
more optimistic context:  
Had the preposterous idea of fixing the language been adopted by our Saxon 
ancestors . . . , the progress of ideas must have stopped with that of the 
language . . . . [A]s we advance in the knowledge of new things, and of new 
combinations of old ones, we must have new words to express them. 
JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 194 (quoting 14 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (AE 
Bergh ed., 1905) (letter to Joseph Milligan, Apr. 1816)); cf. HENRY HITCHINGS, THE 
SECRET LIFE OF WORDS: HOW ENGLISH BECAME ENGLISH 5 (2008) (“A new word is a 
solution to a problem.”). 
  This utilitarian conception of neologism existed at least as long ago as 
ancient Rome. Michel Bréal, who himself coined the word “semantics,” quotes the 
Roman poet Lucretius: “Utilitas expressit nomina rerum”—i.e., “The pressing need has 
created the name of things.” See BRIGITTE NERLICH, CHANGE IN LANGUAGE: WHITNEY, 
BRÉAL, AND WEGENER 90, 118-19 (1990). Yet, necessity is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to ensure that neologisms will prosper. Compare MICHEL BRÉAL, THE 
BEGINNINGS OF SEMANTICS: ESSAYS, LECTURES AND REVIEWS 158 (George Wolf ed. & 
trans., 1991) (“[L]anguage is not addressed solely to reason: it seeks to move, to 
persuade, to please. Thus we find new images arising for very old things . . . .”), with 
STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN 
NATURE 304-05 (2007) (“Many gaps in the language simply refuse to be filled,” such as 
“[a] collective term for one’s nieces and nephews.”).  
 256 NERLICH, supra note 255, at 118-19 (quoting Bréal). 
 257 Id. at 101-02 (discussing the views of William Whitney). 
 258 Id. at 102 (discussing the views of Whitney); see also id. at 131 (discussing 
the views of Bréal, “But language as a system of signs [i.e., words] and a system of 
analogies allows the creation of new signs by the analogical application of old material 
to new uses according to traditional models. In this way creativity is not entirely free, 
not an irrational outburst, but a systematic exploitation of the possibilities provided by 
language.”).  
 259 Lemkin, Introduction, supra note 123, at 32. 
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important problem worthy of states’ attention and concern. To 
these can be added the further challenges of making his 
proposed solution both intelligible to the public and palatable 
to the very states whose dominion it would curtail.  
C. Lemkin’s Resources 
Just as situations confront advocates with challenges, 
they also often offer “material that can work to the advocate’s 
advantage.”260 These resources display the same variety as 
rhetorical constraints except that they favor the advocate’s 
position. The relationship between constraints and resources 
may be illustrated briefly: in a legal dispute that turns on the 
meaning of a statute, if a traditional interpretive maxim favors 
the plaintiff but the legislative history favors the defendant, 
what is a constraint for one party is an equal and opposite 
resource for the other. 
As Lemkin navigated constraints in pursuit of his 
objective, the situation also presented him with resources. 
1. Etymology 
Like other neologists, Lemkin had a variety of strategies 
available to assure the intelligibility of his word. He chose 
etymology.261 
Immediately upon introducing his word, Lemkin 
highlights its etymology: “This new word . . . is made from the 
ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide 
(killing) . . . .”262 Lemkin frequently repeats this etymology,263 
successfully persuading others of its significance.264 
 
 260 JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 516. 
 261 Lemkin also relies on analogy, another common technique of word 
formation. See text accompanying supra note 258. He notes that his word 
“correspond[s] in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide [sic], infanticide, 
etc.” LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79; see also id. at xi (“by way of analogy, see 
homocide [sic], fratricide”). 
 262 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 79. In this, Lemkin’s coinage follows (quite 
literally) Henry Morgenthau Sr.’s phrase “race murder.” See POWER, supra note 9, at 6. 
 263 See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 147; Lemkin, Genocide, supra 
note 176, at 228. But see Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7 (omitting etymology).  
 264 For one of the many endorsements of genocide featuring its etymology, see 
Editorial, Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1946. Lemkin can even be seen on YouTube, 
where a television interviewer introduces him by relaying the etymology of his word. 
Quincy Howe, The Genocide Word by Raphael Lemkin, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFPch5OILfU. 
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Lemkin’s appeal to the classics is common in word 
formation,265 especially among scientists and others seeking to 
imbue their coinages with prestige.266 This practice has its 
critics, notably George Orwell: “Bad writers, and especially 
scientific, political, and sociological writers, are nearly always 
haunted by the notion that Latin or Greek words are grander 
than Saxon ones . . . . The result, in general, is an increase in 
slovenliness and vagueness.”267 
Linguists offer a different critique. They reject the value 
of etymology to word meanings, notwithstanding its popular 
appeal, because “[u]nstoppable change is the great given in 
linguistics . . . .”268 Nevertheless, precisely because of its public 
appeal, neologists may invoke etymology to render their 
coinages intelligible to the audience. Likewise, where word 
meanings are contested, etymology may be a useful resource for 
advocates on one side.269  
 
 265 The practice of deriving English words from Greek has been so common for 
so long that the number of such words is “greater than the total number of ancient 
Greek words known actually to have existed . . . .” HITCHINGS, supra note 255, at 182. 
 266 Id. at 183. The two main “motivations for borrowing” words from another 
language are “need” and “prestige,” with prestige often driving “Graeco-Latin 
borrowings.” As a result, such words tend to convey an “educated/technological 
register,” which strikes many English speakers as “high-falutin.” See HANS HENRICH 
HOCK, PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 408-09, 425 (2d ed. 1991). 
 267 George Orwell, Politics and the English Language (1946), reprinted in GEORGE 
ORWELL, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 156, 161 (1981); accord WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. 
WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 77 (4th ed. 2000) (“Anglo-Saxon is a livelier tongue than 
Latin, so use Anglo-Saxon words.”); THE ECONOMIST STYLE GUIDE 62-63 (1996) (“Short 
words. Use them. They are often Anglo-Saxon rather than Latin in origin.”). 
 268 PINKER, supra note 255, at 149; see also D. CONNOR FERRIS, UNDERSTANDING 
SEMANTICS 10 (1983) (“[V]irtually all specialists in semantics agree that we do not need 
etymology in order to understand particular meanings, or meaning in general . . . . [T]he 
meaning associated with a form can change, and change very dramatically, through 
time.”); F.R. PALMER, SEMANTICS 11 (2d ed. 1981) (“Etymology for its own sake is of little 
importance, even if it has curiosity value, and there really should be no place for a 
smattering of it in dictionaries.”); NERLICH, supra note 255, at 76, 81, 88, 131-33 
(discussing the views of Bréal, Whitney, and Ferdinand de Saussure). 
 269 See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 153-54. For invocations of Lemkin’s 
etymology in legal and political discourse, see, for example, Application of Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 193 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosn. & Herz.] (arguing that 
the etymology supports construing the Convention to require that a group of victims 
“must have particular positive characteristics . . . and not the lack of them”); SCHABAS, 
supra note 15, at 157 (describing Belgian argument that the etymology supported 
excluding political groups from the Convention’s protected groups). 
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2. Associations with the Holocaust 
As awareness about the Holocaust270 spread during the 
war,271 public revulsion proved a powerful resource for Lemkin. He 
deployed this resource in several recurring strands of his rhetoric. 
a. Churchill’s Atlantic Charter Address 
Churchill met Roosevelt in August 1941, when the 
President of the still-neutral United States took a significant 
step toward allying with England by agreeing to the Atlantic 
Charter’s “common principles” for the “better future” they 
hoped would follow “after the final destruction of the Nazi 
tyranny.”272 On August 24, upon his return to England, 
Churchill gave a radio address about the Atlantic Charter. In 
this broadcast, Churchill recites German conquest of a long list 
of countries then turns to the German invasion of Russia: 
The Russian armies and all the peoples of the Russian Republic have 
rallied to the defence of their hearths and homes . . . . For the first 
time in [Hitler’s] experience mass murder has become unprofitable. He 
retaliates by the most frightful cruelties. As his armies advance, whole 
districts are being exterminated. Scores of thousands . . . of executions 
in cold blood are being perpetrated by the German police-troops upon 
the Russian patriots who defend their native soil. Since the Mongol 
invasions of Europe in the sixteenth century, there has never been 
methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale. And this is but the 
beginning. Famine and pestilence have yet to follow in the bloody ruts 
of Hitler’s tanks. We are in the presence of a crime without a name.273  
Lemkin seizes on Churchill’s speech. Titling the 
introduction to an article “A crime without a name,” Lemkin 
 
 270 Not yet known by that name, which did not come into use until the 1950s. 
See COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 315 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter OED] 
(attributing the specific application of The Holocaust to “historians during the 1950s,” 
while recognizing that this usage “had been foreshadowed by contemporary references 
[during the 1940s] to the Nazi atrocities as a ‘holocaust’” in the sense of “a great 
slaughter or massacre”). 
 271 See generally MARTIN GILBERT, AUSCHWITZ AND THE ALLIES (1981) 
(describing the course of revelations about Nazi atrocities); see also Edward Ward, 
Buchenwald Concentration Camp (BBC Radio Broadcast Apr. 1, 1945), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/holocaust/5107.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) 
(recordings of the BBC’s radio broadcasts during April 1945 upon the liberation of the 
Belsen, Buchenwald, and Zutphen camps).  
 272 See Atlantic Charter, supra note 59. On the history of the Atlantic Charter, 
see, for example, MARTIN GILBERT, 6 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR, 1939-1941, 
at 1161-64 (1983). 
 273 Winston Churchill, The Atlantic Charter, Aug. 24, 1941, in VI WINSTON S. 
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 6472, 6474 (R.R. James ed., 1974).  
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proceeds to expressly reference Churchill’s broadcast.274 He 
continues, “Would mass murder be an adequate name for such a 
phenomenon? We think not, since it does not connote the 
motivation of the crime, especially when the motivation is based 
upon racial, national or religious considerations. . . . Genocide is the 
crime of destroying national, racial or religious groups.”275 With 
this, Lemkin successfully ties his word to Churchill’s great cause.276 
Yet, it is not apparent from the face of Churchill’s text 
that he had in mind Lemkin’s conception of genocide. 
Churchill’s entire speech conspicuously omits any mention of 
Nazi persecution of the Jews.277 Churchill refers to no motives 
other than retaliation, no intent to destroy Russians as a 
group. Instead, he stresses the unprecedented volume of blood 
shed by Hitler. If Churchill intended the last sentence of the 
quoted passage to signify anything more than a nice oratorical 
flourish, it may well be something like, “We are in the presence 
of a crime of unspeakable magnitude.”  
On the other hand, it is well to remember that Churchill 
himself was engaged in the rhetorical project of his life—
stiffening British resolve and building alliances with the 
Americans and Russians toward the eventual defeat of Hitler. 
Churchill too faced rhetorical constraints. It is even possible 
that Churchill may have meant to include Nazi persecution of 
 
 274 Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227.  
 275 Id. at 227-28. In some tellings, Lemkin claims Churchill’s speech as the 
direct inspiration for his effort to coin the word genocide. See, e.g., Elder, supra note 34, 
at 523 n.7 (“Lemkin said [in 1951] that during WWII he heard a radio broadcast given 
by Churchill in which he stated that the Nazis ‘commit[ed] a crime without a name.’ 
This, according to [Lemkin], led him on the search for the word genocide.”). 
 276 See, e.g., Editorial, Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1946 (associating 
genocide with Churchill’s “crime without a name”); POWER, supra note 9, at ch. 2 (“A 
Crime Without a Name”); id. at ch. 3 (“The Crime With a Name”).  
  Churchill himself may have welcomed Lemkin’s effort to connect their 
causes. According to A.M. Rosenthal, Churchill “backed” Lemkin’s nomination for the 
Nobel Peace Prize in the 1950s. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at A31. I have not been able to 
find any further evidence of Churchill’s support or any explanation for it. The Nobel 
archives have no correspondence from Churchill in the Lemkin file. E-mail from Nobel 
Institute to author (May 10, 2011) (on file with author). Sir Martin Gilbert has searched 
the Churchill archives for materials about Lemkin, but found none. Telephone interview 
with Sir Martin Gilbert, honorary fellow, Merton College, Oxford (Mar. 10, 2011). Steve 
Jacobs has searched the Lemkin archives (which are incomplete) for correspondence from 
Churchill, but found none. Telephone Interview with Steve Jacobs, Associate Professor, 
University of Alabama, Department of Religious Studies (Mar. 21, 2011). 
 277 Churchill had addressed Nazi persecution of Jews in other comments, 
public and private, dating back at least as far as 1933. For example, on December 21, 
1937, Churchill said, “[I]t is a horrible thing that a race of people should be attempted 
to be blotted out of the society in which they have been born.” 5 MARTIN GILBERT, 
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: THE PROPHET OF TRUTH, 1922-1939, at 889 (1977); see also id. 
at 448, 459, 486, 680-81, 800, 954; GILBERT, supra note 272, at 99, 1004. 
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the Jews within his “crime without a name,” but was 
constrained from expressly saying so. Sir Martin Gilbert 
believes the most important constraint on Churchill at that 
time was the need to preserve the secrecy of the British spying 
program that provided all his intelligence about anti-Jewish 
atrocities.278 Churchill also may have been constrained, to some 
extent, by the BBC’s reluctance to broadcast atrocity stories, 
particularly where the victims were Jewish.279 
Lemkin thus draws on Churchill’s speech as a resource 
and characterizes it in a way that is plausible (if contestable). In 
so doing, Lemkin positions genocide as a solution to a problem 
important enough to be raised by one of the leaders of the Free 
World, linking his word with Churchill’s fame and reputation. 
b. The Murder of Millions 
Lemkin also directly invokes the scale of the Nazi 
horrors. “While society sought protection against . . . crimes 
directed against individuals, there has been no serious 
endeavor hitherto to prevent and punish the murder and 
destruction of millions.”280 Also, “when one man is murdered, it 
is murder. We cannot accept the proposition that organizing 
the murder of millions is less than murder.”281  
 
 278 Telephone Interview with Sir Martin Gilbert, supra note 276; accord 
MARTIN GILBERT, CHURCHILL AND THE JEWS: A LIFELONG FRIENDSHIP 186-87 (2007) 
(Churchill “had to be careful not to reveal his source, for fear of alerting the Germans 
to the fact that their most secret communications . . . were being read by the code-
breakers at Bletchley Park.”).  
 279 See Jeremy Harris, Broadcasting the Massacres: An Analysis of the BBC’s 
Contemporary Coverage of the Holocaust, 25 YAD VASHEM STUD. 65 (1996). Harris 
offers several explanations for this reluctance, including anti-Semitism among BBC 
officials and influential civil servants; concern about stirring “latent antisemitism” in 
the British public; anxiety that the British public would regard atrocity stories as 
propaganda, a problem exacerbated by revelations that the BBC had in fact broadcast 
some propaganda about German atrocities during the First World War; and “the fact 
that the British people were simply not interested in hearing more gloomy reports.” Id.; 
cf. GILBERT, AUSCHWITZ, supra note 271, at 15 (“[O]n 25 July 1941, a Ministry of 
Information Document had warned British policymakers . . . . [that discussion of Nazi 
atrocities] ‘must be used very sparingly and must deal always with indisputably 
innocent people . . . . And not with Jews.’”).  
 280 Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227. 
 281 Raphael Lemkin, The Legal Case Against Hitler, Part I, NATION, Feb. 24, 
1945, at 205, 206 [hereinafter Lemkin, Legal Case I]; see also Raphael Lemkin, Letter 
to the Editor, Genocide Before the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1946, at C22 (“gassing 
millions of human beings”). 
  Lemkin’s unpublished works press this theme as well. See Lemkin, Totally 
Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 367 (“When I studied law, . . . I felt that if the killing 
of one man was a crime . . . , the destruction of millions of people should also be a 
crime, and, moreover, it should be an international crime . . . .”); id. at 371 
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The rhetorical power of this argument is plain. Yet, in 
drawing from this rhetorical resource, Lemkin suggests a 
conception of genocide as mass-murder at odds with his own 
“ethnico-cultural concept[ion].”282 
c. The Advocate’s Foresight 
The advocate’s own reputation is often a valuable 
resource. If the audience accepts that the advocate has 
desirable attributes (e.g., wisdom), that may persuade the 
audience to pay greater attention to the advocate’s arguments 
or to give those arguments the benefit of the doubt. For 
example, if the audience accepts that the advocate has been 
correct in the past in important and relevant respects, that 
provides a resource for the advocate’s current argument.283 In 
cases where the advocate’s reputation is not known to or fully 
appreciated by the audience, the advocate may establish it in 
the audience’s mind by self-credentialing.  
Lemkin deploys this resource in staking claim 
(justifiably)284 to being the first to diagnose the horrific nature 
of the Nazi regime. In the author’s note to one article, Lemkin 
describes himself: “RAPHAEL LEMKIN is Polish but his 
 
(“Sovereignty, I argued, cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent 
people. . . . Why is the killing of a million a lesser crime than the killing of a single 
individual?” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 282 Cf. COOPER, supra note 31, at 58 (“‘There must be a hierarchy of values in 
human society and the preservation of life must be on the top of this hierarchy.’” 
(quoting a letter Lemkin wrote on April 19, 1949)). 
 283 In a similar vein, Aristotle argues that a speaker should “construct a view of 
himself as a certain kind of person,” particularly as someone who possesses “practical 
wisdom . . . and virtue . . . and good will,” because character (ethos) “is almost . . . the 
controlling factor in persuasion.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 38, 120. Aristotle believes, 
however, that “this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the 
speaker is a certain kind of person.” Id. at 38. Kennedy explains:  
Aristotle thus does not include in rhetorical ethos the authority that a 
speaker may possess due to his position in government or society, previous 
actions, reputation for wisdom, or anything except what is actually contained 
in the speech and the character it reveals. Presumably, he would regard all 
other factors, sometimes highly important in the success of rhetoric, as 
inartistic; but he never says so.  
Id. at 38 n.43; see also id. at 311 (describing the Rhetoric’s “fail[ure] to recognize the 
great role of the authority of a speaker as already perceived by an audience” as one of 
its “limitations”). 
 284 See Ignatieff, supra note 212, at 26-27 (“To appreciate Lemkin’s 
achievement, we must see it not as the ratification of easily available common sense, 
but as a counterintuitive leap of the imagination beyond the realm of what common 
sense deemed possible. . . . Lemkin [had] the intelligence and the courage to have 
identified an abominable new intention when others saw only immemorial 
cruelty . . . .”). 
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viewpoint is international and his understanding of the nazi 
[sic] menace is of more than recent date. . . . At the Madrid 
Conference of 1933 he introduced the first proposal ever made 
to outlaw nazism [sic] by declaring it a crime.”285 Lemkin also 
attributes various harms to the rejection of his Madrid proposal 
to outlaw barbarity and vandalism. For example, Axis Rule 
states: “If the punishment of genocide practices had formed a 
part of international law . . . since 1933, there would be no 
necessity now to issue admonitions to neutral countries not to 
give refuge to war criminals.”286 
Lemkin likewise claims that the rejection of his Madrid 
proposal complicated the Nuremberg prosecutions287 and even, 
rather implausibly, that it was “one of the thousand reasons 
why . . . [American] boys are fighting and dying in [World War 
II].”288 
By attributing such grave consequences to the failure to 
heed his previous advice, Lemkin credentials himself as 
someone with unique insight into genocide and whose diagnosis 
of and prescription for it are therefore due an additional 
measure of respect.289 Other Lemkin statements may also be 
seen in this light. For example, Lemkin prefaces his 
congressional testimony advocating war crimes prosecutions 
with the remark, “I base my observations on actual experiences 
in this war. I was subject myself to war crimes. . . . I have 
observed war crimes.”290 More striking is Lemkin’s description 
of a childhood conversation with his mother, after reading the 
Polish novel Quo Vadis? about Romans killing Christians, as 
 
 285 Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136, at 43; cf. LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, 
supra note 3, at 91 (noting that he had proposed, “[a]s far back as 1933,” outlawing 
conduct that “would amount to the actual conception of genocide”); Lemkin, War 
Against Genocide, supra note 181 (“Dr. Raphael Lemkin has crystallized the concept of 
genocide and given it its name.”).  
 286 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 92.  
 287 See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, supra note 53, at 146-47 (“Sir Hartley 
Shawcross . . . declared that the failure of this [1933 Madrid] proposal made it 
impossible to punish some of the serious Nazi crimes.”). 
 288 POWER, supra note 9, at 44 & n.43. 
 289 Lemkin also persuaded other supporters of his genocide project to 
credential him in this manner. See, e.g., Editorial, Genocide Under the Law of Nations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1947, at E11 (“As far back as 1933 Professor Lemkin 
submitted . . . a draft of a measure which was to permit the apprehension of a 
genocidist . . . .”).  
 290 Lemkin Statement, supra note 55, at 61.  
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“the day I began to crusade” against genocide291—a narrative 
that conveys a sense of destiny.292  
3. Preexisting International Crimes 
Advocates for change often must demonstrate that their 
proposals are feasible.293 Precedent is a powerful resource 
against charges of windmill-chasing. If something similar has 
been done before, the advocate can establish a greater 
likelihood that it may be done again. 
From the start, in his Madrid proposal, Lemkin invokes 
preexisting international crimes as precedent. He lists seven 
recognized international crimes: piracy, counterfeiting of 
currency, terrorism, and trade in slaves, women and children, 
narcotics, and obscene publications.294 He mentions that this 
list is not fixed but changes over time.295 He identifies in the 
existing list a theme supporting the prohibition of “general 
(transnational) danger” and then explains how barbarity and 
vandalism fit within that theme.296  
Lemkin, however, also invokes the precedents in a more 
troublesome way. Striving to appeal to the common-sense 
notion that the greater threat deserves priority over the lesser, 
Lemkin appears to belittle some of the existing offenses. In his 
draft of General Assembly Resolution 96(I), he contrasts “the 
very serious crime of genocide” with “crimes of a relatively 
lesser importance.”297 The General Assembly omitted this 
unfortunate language from the final resolution.  
 
 291 KOREY, supra note 37, at 5 (quoting Lemkin). 
 292 Cf. Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 381 (recalling that a 
colleague at Duke once told him, “I have no doubt that you were saved . . . for a special 
purpose . . . . It is bigger than you are, or than any of us—wait and you will see.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 293 Cf. Bitzer, supra note 72, at 33 (“A person who believes his response [to an 
exigence] could not in any way modify it is not likely to respond, even though the 
exigence is urgent . . . . As modification capability increases, readiness to respond 
increases.”). Similarly, Jasinski observes that advocates for change must prove that 
“there is a better way to do things”—in other words, beyond establishing the existence 
of a problem, they must show that they have a solution that is affordable, effective, 
feasible, etc. See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 458. 
 294 Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2; accord LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, 
supra note 3, at 94 (listing “so-called delicta juris gentium,” including “white slavery 
and trade in children, piracy, trade in narcotics and in obscene publications, and 
counterfeiting of money”). 
 295 Lemkin, Madrid Proposal, supra note 41, at 2-3. 
 296 Id. at 3-4. 
 297 U.N. Doc. A/BUR/50, reprinted in 1 THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, supra 
note 178, at 3 (“Whereas the punishment of the very serious crime of genocide when 
committed in time of peace lies within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the 
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V. ASSESSING LEMKIN’S RHETORICAL STRATEGY 
A. Rhetorical Success 
Any assessment of Lemkin’s rhetorical strategy must 
begin with its amazing success. Lemkin persuaded the United 
Nations to devote its first human rights treaty to eliminating 
the “odious scourge”298 he identified, named, and publicized.  
The Genocide Convention encapsulates not only Lemkin’s 
word, but his sovereignty-bounding purpose. It follows his vision in 
many key respects. It accepts his conception of genocide as the 
destruction of a group. Only “national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group[s]” qualify;299 the Convention omits Resolution 96(I)’s broader 
reference to “political and other groups.”300 The Convention 
“confirm[s]” that genocide “is a crime under international law,”301 
subject to prosecution by the courts where it occurs or by such 
“international penal tribunal” as may be established.302 The 
Convention’s thrust is prosecutorial; although aimed at both the 
 
judiciary of every State concerned, while crimes of a relatively lesser importance such 
as piracy, trade in women, children, drugs, obscene publications are declared as 
international crimes and have been made matters of international concern;”); accord 
Raphael Lemkin, Letter to the Editor, Genocide Before the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1946, at C22 (“It seems inconsistent with our concepts of civilization that selling a drug 
to an individual is a matter of worldly concern, while gassing millions of human beings 
might be a problem of internal concern. It seems also inconsistent with our philosophy 
of life that abduction of one woman for prostitution is an international crime while 
sterilization of millions of women remains an internal affair of the state in question.”). 
 298 Genocide Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. 
 299 See id. art. II. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 117-71.  
 300 G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13 (“racial, religious, political and other 
groups . . . whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political, or other 
grounds”). For a time after passage of Resolution 96 (I), Lemkin adapted his public 
comments to the Resolution’s broader conception of genocide. See, e.g., Lemkin, AJIL, 
supra note 53, at 145-46 (“human groups”); Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra note 7 
(“racial, national, religious” and other human groups, plus “linguistic, and political 
groups”). Nevertheless, in UN deliberations, Lemkin favored excluding political groups 
from the definition of genocide. See Secretariat Comments on Draft Convention, U.N. 
Doc. E/447, reprinted in 1 THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, supra note 178, at 209, 230 
(describing Lemkin’s opposition on the grounds that “political groups have not the 
permanency and the specific characteristics of the other groups” and including them 
would be controversial and unnecessary); Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 
7, at 391 (“I myself thought that the destruction of political opponents should be 
treated as the crime of political homicide, but not as genocide. Every revolutionary 
regime comes to power by destroying some of its opponents.”); SCHABAS, supra note 15, 
at 61, 160 (“The exclusion of political groups . . . corresponded to Raphael Lemkin’s 
vision of the nature of the crime of genocide.” (citations omitted)).  
 301 Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. I. 
 302 Id. art. VI. 
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“prevention and punishment” of genocide,303 the Convention’s 
provisions on prevention are notably underdeveloped.304 
Lemkin achieved his ambition to bound sovereignty 
with genocide and make it an international concern—indeed, 
an international crime—regardless of traditional notions of 
territoriality and nationality. And he achieved it to an extent 
that must have seemed quixotic in 1944: twenty states adhered 
to the Convention within two years of its adoption, bringing it 
into force in January 1951;305 sixty years later, that number has 
grown to 141 states.306 Beyond these numbers, moreover, in a 
series of groundbreaking decisions, the International Court of 
Justice has pronounced that the prohibition of genocide is 
custom, jus cogens and erga omnes,307 and that states party to 
 
 303 This is reflected in both the formal title of the Genocide Convention, supra note 
14, and in Article I, where the parties “undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide.  
 304 The Convention provides only, “Any Contracting Party may call upon the 
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action . . . as they consider 
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide . . . .” Genocide 
Convention, supra note 14, art. VIII. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 520-92. 
Scholars disparaged the weakness of this provision for decades. See, e.g., Van Schaack, 
supra note 27, at 1137-39 (criticizing the Convention’s language on prevention as 
“frustratingly indeterminate,” “irresolute,” and “anemic”). But see infra note 308 and 
accompanying text.  
  Lemkin plainly cared—deeply and energetically—about preventing 
genocide. But his writings display a curious lack of attention to the ways in which his 
word, and the resulting Convention, would achieve his goal. This may reflect, given 
Lemkin’s own background as a criminal prosecutor, a belief that punishment is 
prevention, per ordinary deterrence theories of criminal law. But see U.N. Doc. E/447, 
reprinted in 1 THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, supra note 178, at 247-48 (“All criminal 
law has a preventive effect. The fact that there is a law tends to deter and prevent 
action by persons who might be tempted to commit a crime. Experience shows, 
however, that the preventive effect of threats is limited, since these do not stop certain 
criminals . . . . In the international field even more than in the national, it is essential 
to exercise constant vigilance . . . .”). Alternatively, it may reflect faith that the 
newfound United Nations—or, perhaps, individual states—would have the will and 
capacity to “prevent[] and suppress[]” genocide effectively if they understood his concept 
and the facts of a particular situation. But see KOREY, supra note 37, at 31-32 (suggesting 
that Lemkin proposed privately that the UN establish an office devoted to genocide 
prevention, but dropped this proposal when others counseled him that it was unrealistic). 
 305 See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. XIII (bringing the Convention 
into force ninety days after the twentieth ratification or accession); UNTS Online, 
supra note 64. 
 306 See UNTS Online, supra note 64; cf. Lauren Walsh, A Conversation with 
Oscar Schachter, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 343, 344 (1997) (“In 1948, . . . the 
architects planning the future headquarters asked me how many seats they should 
make in the General Assembly . . . . An international lawyer would be expected to know 
how many sovereign states existed and were potential members. I confidently 
answered the architects . . . that they could safely add twenty seats to the fifty-one 
[members at that time]. It did not take long for my estimate to be mistaken and for 
costly renovations to be needed.”). 
 307 See Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) (the Convention’s 
“principles . . . are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any 
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the Convention have an “obligation,” which is “both normative 
and compelling,” “to employ all means reasonably available to 
them . . . to prevent genocide so far as possible.”308 
Substantively, then, Lemkin produced what Cass 
Sunstein calls a “norm cascade,” a “rapid shift[] in norms.”309 He 
developed the concept of genocide as a distinct phenomenon, he 
named it, he proposed (and later helped to draft) a treaty 
outlawing it, and he persuaded the nations of the world to 
promulgate and ratify a treaty adopting his word and, to a 
considerable extent, his definition and his remedy. Lemkin is a 
“norm entrepreneur”310 who succeeded through energy, 
persistence, even self-sacrifice.311  
Lemkin’s rhetorical strategy deserves credit. His 
original idea languished until his turn to genocide in 1944. 
Genocide proved potent, filling a felt social need for a new word 
to address Nazi horrors. Lemkin adroitly affirmed and satisfied 
this need, positioning his word as the solution to Churchill’s 
“crime without a name.”312  
Luban praises Lemkin’s coinage: “Lemkin’s word 
eventually conquered the world. It became one of the most 
powerful in any language, and it reshaped the moral landscape 
of the world . . . . In doing so, it also reshaped our consciousness 
 
conventional obligation”); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of 
Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 64 (July 6) (the “prohibition of genocide” is 
“assuredly” jus cogens); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5) (“the outlawing of acts of . . . genocide” is erga omnes). 
 308 Bosn. & Herz., supra note 269, ¶¶ 427-30. 
 309 Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms]. Sunstein argues that social norms 
influence behavior by tapping “wellsprings of shame and pride,” thus affecting the 
“self-conception” and “reputation” of individuals within a community. Id. at 916-17, 
952. Sunstein elsewhere notes the power of law qua expression, even without 
significant risk of enforcement, to change social norms. See Cass Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031-32 (1996). He writes: “[L]aw 
might attempt to express a judgment about the underlying activity in such a way as to 
alter social norms. If we see norms as a tax on or a subsidy to choice, the law might 
attempt to change a subsidy into a tax, or vice versa.” Id. at 2034. This description of 
law’s social power seems particularly apt when applied to the criminalization of 
genocide, where the lack of effective enforcement persists as a tragic problem, but 
where there nevertheless is a meaningful sense that social norms in the international 
community now impose a considerable “tax” on states that commit genocide and even 
on states that tolerate its commission by others. Cf. POWER, supra note 9, at 514 
(“[T]he word ‘genocide’ . . . has acquired a potent moral stigma. The vows of U.S. 
policymakers to never again allow the crime and the lengths to which they have gone, 
while allowing genocide, to deny its occurrence is in itself testament to the stigma.”). 
 310 Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 309, at 909. 
 311 Cf. Editorial, Raphael Lemkin: Crusader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1959, at 20 
(Lemkin’s “crusade . . . . was a heavy burden, and last Friday it killed him . . . . Death 
in action was his final argument . . . .”). 
 312 See supra Part IV.C.2.a.  
606 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
and, to some extent, it reshaped our culture as well.”313 Luban 
does not specify how genocide “reshaped our consciousness” or 
which “culture” it “reshaped.” I would specify that genocide 
reshaped, at the least, the culture of international law and our 
consciousness of that law—our consciousness, that is, of the 
proper relationships between states; among individuals, 
peoples, and states; and among states, law, and justice. 
Genocide helped to move our consciousness beyond the narrow 
confines of (most) traditional diplomacy toward a wider 
dialogue about the concerns of a common humanity with 
meaningful participation by nonstates. Genocide helped to start 
what Philip Jessup first called “a modern law of nations”314 and 
then “transnational law.”315 
In striving to bound sovereignty, Lemkin assaulted the 
citadel. Sovereignty was “the fundamental principle . . . on 
which the whole of international law rests.”316 In terms of 
rhetoric scholarship, sovereignty was (and is) an ideograph of 
the international community, a “term[] we use [in public 
discourse] to impart value, justify decisions, motivate behavior, 
and debate policy initiatives.”317 Common ideographs in U.S. 
 
 313 Luban, supra note 26, at 307. 
 314 See JESSUP, supra note 134, at 2. Jessup argues that “international law, 
like national law, must be directly applicable to the individual,” calling this one of the 
two “keystones of a revised international legal order.” Id. Writing before the adoption of 
the Genocide Convention, he describes Resolution 96 (I) as “[a] major step” toward 
accepting individuals as subjects of international law. Id. at 183; accord Text of 
Truman’s Letter Transmitting His Report on U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1947, at 4 (praising 
the Resolution as having “profound significance to the state” because of its progress 
“toward the application of international law to individuals as well as to states”). Given 
Jessup’s emphasis on making international law apply directly to individuals, his decision 
to revive the old phrase “the law of nations” was apt. See JANIS, supra note 109, at 13 
(showing that “the law of nations” traditionally included individual rights and 
obligations, but when Jeremy Bentham coined “international law” he limited his 
conception “exclusively [to] the rights and obligations of states inter se”). 
 315 See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) (arguing that the 
traditional term international law fails to capture “all law which regulates actions or 
events that transcend national frontiers”). Jessup adds, “Having argued in 1948 that 
[recognizing individuals as subjects of international law] was a desirable position . . . , I 
am prepared to say it is now established.” Id. at 3 & n.6; cf. Lemkin, Introduction, 
supra note 123, at 60 (criticizing the “half-truth” that “states alone” are the subjects of 
international law, because “the law of nations is a law of individuals enforced 
through . . . governments”). 
 316 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 263 (June 27); see also Peters, supra note 142. 
 317 JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 309 (citation omitted). Jasinski also compares 
ideographs to Weaver’s idea of “ultimate terms,” the “terms to which the very highest 
respect is paid.” Id. 
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public discourse include liberty and national security, as well as 
sovereignty itself.318 
The meaning of ideographs is often contested, because 
they are inherently abstract and enjoy unique importance in 
the political vocabulary.319 “Questions involving the meaning of 
political words lie at the very foundation of political society, 
and accordingly as they are settled in one way or another, the 
whole fabric must assume a different shape and character.”320 
Given the centrality of sovereignty in international society, the 
very fabric of that society changes with the content and import 
of that word. Lemkin thus challenged “the whole fabric” of the 
international legal order by contesting the absolutist vision of 
sovereignty as end. He sought to reconstitute that order, with 
sovereignty redefined, reimagined as means to human-centered 
ends, and subordinated to his new concept of genocide in the 
hierarchy of values.321 
Lemkin’s success in reprioritizing international legal 
values is shown whenever allegations of genocide arise. No state 
asserts a sovereign right to commit genocide. States instead 
deny the factual allegations, deny their legal characterization as 
genocide, or both.322 In some cases, to be sure, these denials are 
 
 318 For one famous example of argumentation in the name of sovereignty, see 
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936) (reasoning that the 
constitutional doctrine of enumerated powers “is categorically true only in respect of our 
internal affairs” because “the United States is not completely sovereign” if the federal 
government lacks any power held by other nations with regard to external relations). 
 319 See JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 309-10. If it is “the customary office of a 
word to cover, not a point, but a territory, and a territory that is irregular, 
heterogeneous, and variable,” NERLICH, supra note 255, at 117 (quoting Whitney), 
ideographs cover a larger swath than most words, strategically located and hosting rich 
resources. For a more cynical take on the same phenomenon of contestation, see 
ORWELL, supra note 267, at 161 (“Many political words are similarly abused. The word 
Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable.’ 
The words democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice have each of them 
several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one another.”). But see 
MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 131 (2004) (“When communist Bulgaria called 
itself a ‘people’s democracy,’ only fools were fooled.”). 
 320 JASINSKI, supra note 67, at 194 (quoting an anonymous writer, 1833). 
 321 Cf. id. at 522 (“Prudential dilemmas sometimes are resolved by creating 
distinctions or by introducing new concepts that help to describe the world in a different 
way. An innovative concept such as ‘marital rape,’ for example, restructures how we think 
about gender relations and the tension between public obligations and private rights.”). 
 322 For example, although Serbia & Montenegro contended that it was not 
bound by the Genocide Convention, it did not claim a right to commit genocide, but 
instead defended on the grounds that “the acts alleged . . . have not been committed at 
all” and, “if some have been committed,” they neither were done with the intent 
required by the Convention nor were attributable to the state. See Bosn. & Herz., supra 
note 269, ¶¶ 65-66 (summarizing the parties’ contentions); see also id. ¶ 80 
(summarizing Serbia & Montenegro’s position that it had not succeeded to the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Convention). 
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disingenuous—“the tribute that vice pays to virtue.”323 Even so, 
such tributes make and reinforce international law, confirming 
genocide’s place in its normative hierarchy. 
Indeed, genocide prevention—perhaps best expressed by 
the maxim “Never again!”—may even have come to qualify itself 
as an ideograph of the international community. This objective 
fits comfortably with the human rights purposes of the United 
Nations,324 especially when that organization is viewed in the 
historical context of its founding in 1945. Institutionally, 
embarrassed by its failures in (at the least) Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, the United Nations established the Office of 
the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide,325 as well as 
the ad hoc criminal tribunals. The first Special Advisor has 
declared that “preventing genocide is a principle of international 
law so fundamental that no nation may ignore it.”326 
Of course, if genocide prevention is an ideograph, it is, 
like other ideographs, ambiguous and subject to contestation. 
Broadly put, genocide prevention begs the questions captured 
in “who has what obligations when?” It invites debate about the 
meaning of both genocide327 and prevention,328 and about 
whether prevention entails a ceiling as well as a floor. 
Uncapped, genocide prevention would permit each state to use 
force to stop genocide in any other state by acting unilaterally, 
without express authorization by the Security Council, and 
presumably on its own assessment of the facts and legal 
characterization thereof. The palpable conflict between 
genocide prevention and the outlawing of (most) force329 must be 
 
 323 WALZER, supra note 319, at 4 (describing disingenuous claims about just war). 
 324 See supra note 247.  
 325 See generally Juan Méndez, The United Nations and the Prevention of 
Genocide, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE, supra note 169, at 225 (describing his 
work as the first Special Advisor). 
 326 Id. at 226. 
 327 Proposals to amend the Convention’s definition have been made since at 
least 1952, when the Republic of China proposed changing the official Chinese-
language text to language “roughly interpreted as meaning ‘to cause harm to or to 
destroy human groups in a ruthless manner.’” Chinese Will Ask U.N. to Redefine 
Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1952, at 8 (noting Lemkin’s opposition). Schabas 
identifies at least twelve states that depart from the Conventional definition in their 
domestic statutes. See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 130, 161-71. Meanwhile, unofficial 
definitions abound. See JONES, supra note 25 (compiling sixteen “scholarly definitions” 
proposed 1959-2003).  
 328 In particular, it has been argued that prevention requires no action beyond 
the preventative impact of punishment or beyond a state’s own territory—positions 
both rejected by the I.C.J. See Bosn. & Herz., supra note 269. 
 329 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain . . . from the 
threat or use of force . . . .”). The Charter expresses only two exceptions: self-defense 
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settled (like other prudential dilemmas) with a hierarchy fixing 
the relative priority to be given to these two high-order values 
of international society. This settlement affects not only the 
legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention in the modern 
military sense of the term but also the “shape and character” of 
the international legal order: it determines whether that order 
is characterized by independent initiative or collective action, 
whether it prefers to risk over- or underenforcement.  
B. Some Qualifications 
In assessing Lemkin’s rhetorical success, some 
important qualifications are needed.  
The Convention sometimes diverges from Lemkin’s 
path. Notably, it omits cultural techniques from the list of 
prohibited acts and focuses mainly on physical harm.330 This 
 
and actions authorized by the Security Council “to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.” Id. art. 51, ch. VII.  
 330 The Convention’s definition of genocide includes five actus rei: (a) killing; 
(b) causing serious injury; (c) “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”; (d) “[i]mposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group”; and (e) “[f]orcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.” See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. 
II. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 172-240. Acts (a)-(c) are physical 
techniques in Lemkin’s taxonomy, while (d) is biological. See LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra 
note 3, at 86-89; William Schabas, The Law and Genocide, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, 
supra note 187, at 124, 135 (concluding, in light of the Convention’s negotiating 
history, that “the words ‘to destroy’ [should be read] as if they are modified by 
‘physically’ and ‘biologically’”). On the distinction between biological and physical 
techniques, see supra note 185.  
  The Convention generally omits cultural techniques of genocide. See 
generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 207-13, 220, 646. Although central to Lemkin’s 
vision, the idea of prohibiting “cultural genocide” lacked support among many 
governments. The United States led the opposition, arguing: “‘The decision to make 
genocide a new international crime was extremely serious, and the United States 
believed that the crime should be limited to barbarous acts committed against 
individuals, which, in the eyes of the public, constituted the basic concept of genocide.’” 
Id. at 209 (quoting U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.14 (Apr. 21, 1948), at 10); see also Moses, 
supra note 187, at 38 (noting that the Netherlands opposed prohibiting cultural 
genocide on the ground that it would involve “a lack of logic and of a sense of proportion 
to include in the same convention both mass murder in gas chambers and the closing of 
libraries”). A Soviet proposal to add cultural techniques to the actus rei was defeated by 
a vote of 14-31 with 10 abstentions. See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 213 & n.243. 
  Act (e) is arguably an exception. Axis Rule does not specifically address it, 
but it seems to have both biological (“depopulation”) and social elements. See LEMKIN, 
AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 83, 86. UN discourse abbreviated Lemkin’s long list of 
techniques to three (physical, biological, and cultural), and Act (e) appears in the 
Convention notwithstanding that some deemed it cultural in nature. See, e.g., Draft 
Convention on the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/447, in 1 THE GENOCIDE 
CONVENTION, supra note 178, at 232, 235; cf. SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 201 
(discussing whether Act (e) is biological or cultural in nature).  
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important defeat saddened Lemkin,331 as it was tantamount to 
excluding his idea of vandalism from the Convention.332 The 
Convention also omits universal jurisdiction.333 And it does not 
require perpetrators to aim at the complete destruction of a 
protected group, but only the intent to destroy the group “in 
whole or in part.”334 The words “in part” are necessary from a 
practical perspective, but they also weaken Lemkin’s cultural 
rationale, for a group destroyed in part also survives in part 
and may therefore retain the ability to preserve and generate 
unique cultural contributions.335  
In addition, genocide’s significance should not be 
overstated. Although genocide helped to start the “modern law 
of nations” of which it is characteristic, it does not rise to the 
sine qua non of that law. Other notables who sought to displace 
absolutist sovereignty in the postwar legal order included René 
 
 331 Lemkin’s unpublished memoir records his disappointment:  
This idea was very dear to me. I defended it successfully through two drafts. 
It meant the destruction of the cultural pattern of a group, . . . the shrines of 
the soul of a nation. But there was not enough support for this idea in the 
Committee. After having overcome so many hurdles and with the end of the 
Assembly in sight, I questioned the advisability of engaging in still another 
battle. Would it not endanger the passage of the Convention? So with a heavy 
heart I decided not to press for it. 
Lemkin, Totally Unofficial Man, supra note 7, at 393; cf. Lemkin, UN BULLETIN, supra 
note 7, at 71 (anticipating this trade-off by mentioning, in a passage about cultural 
genocide, that “the draft convention is drawn up in such a way that its structure 
remains valid even if parts should be removed or changed”). 
 332 See Moses, supra note 187, at 38. Lamenting the decision to drop the 
provision on cultural genocide, Lemkin once described it as “the soul of all the 
convention.” See COOPER, supra note 31, at 159 (quoting a letter Lemkin wrote on 
October 20, 1948, to the future Pope John XXIII).  
 333 See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. VI (providing for prosecution 
founded on the more traditional bases of territoriality and consent). See generally 
SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 409-16.  
 334 See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. II (emphasis added). See 
generally SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 273-86. 
 335 As Luban writes: 
The problem is that once the definition is modified [with “in part”], it loses its 
mooring in the group-pluralist theory of value. . . . [G]enocide by destroying 
part of a group no longer removes that group from “the family of 
man.” . . . [I]t loses the special moral-philosophical quality that requires 
singling it out from all other mass killings and mass atrocities. In this way, 
Lemkin’s definition of genocide was compromised from birth: to make the 
crime prosecutable in a world of territorial states, where genocide might 
occur only in one state . . . , the law drifted away from the pure group-
pluralist vision that drove him to distinguish genocide as a crime different 
from all others. 
Luban, supra note 26, at 313 (footnote omitted). 
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Cassin,336 Robert Jackson,337 and Hersch Lauterpacht.338 The 
Nuremberg trials would have been essentially the same had 
genocide never been mentioned there; one can even imagine 
that the Rwanda trials would be substantially the same as 
well—not in their elements and evidence, but in the persons 
charged and the larger moral and political functions served. 
The Allies, following Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms Speech,339 
declared “preserv[ing] human rights” as a war aim within 
weeks after Pearl Harbor340 and later put the language of 
human rights in the UN Charter.341 There is no reason to 
believe the Universal Declaration—and the ensuing network of 
human rights conventions—would have failed but for the 
earlier UN actions against genocide. And traditional notions of 
sovereignty have been challenged by an array of pressures 
often summarized with the shorthand “globalization.”342 
 
 336 See POWER, supra note 9, at 76. In support of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Cassin used language strikingly like that of Lemkin: “The right of 
interference is here; it is here. Why? Because we do not want a repetition of what 
happened in 1933, where Germany began to massacre its own nationals, and 
everybody . . . bowed, saying ‘Thou art sovereign and master in thine own home.’” Id.; 
see also SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 525 (quoting Cassin). The parallel is all the more 
striking in light of Lemkin’s later opposition to the human rights covenants. See 
POWER, supra note 9, at 74-75. 
 337 See Jackson, supra note 135, at 354-55 (arguing that sovereignty should be 
bound by restrictions on the use of force). 
 338 See Vrdoljak, supra note 6, at 1168, 1174 (discussing Lauterpacht’s 
objections to the “deification” of the state and the “dogma of sovereignty”). 
 339 Franklin Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms Speech, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=70 (“Freedom 
means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who 
struggle to gain those rights or keep them.”). 
 340 See Decl. by the U.N., supra note 59, pmbl. (“Being convinced that 
complete victory over their enemies is essential . . . to preserve human rights and 
justice in their own lands as well as in other lands . . . .”). 
 341 See supra note 247. See generally Jan Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The 
Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 447 (1992) 
(discussing the contributions of international lawyers, NGOs, H.G. Wells, and Franklin 
Roosevelt that led to the inclusion of human rights language in the U.N. Charter). 
 342 For an intriguing new argument that the trend to redefine and constrain 
sovereignty has gone too far, see Koskenniemi, supra note 143. Koskenniemi objects 
that essentially political matters are treated instead as technocratic, subject to 
managerial one-size-fits-all solutions without regard to community preferences that 
may vary over time and space. Id. at 67-70. He concludes that “sovereignty articulates 
the hope of experiencing the thrill of having one’s life in one’s own hands”—that a 
community, and an individual within it, may be “for better or for worse, the master of 
one’s life.” Id. at 70. Koskenniemi does not address genocide or crimes against 
humanity, but his argument must not allow sovereignty to shield such horrors, because 
the victims are (to say the least) excluded from the very community, and denied the 
very hope, that Koskenniemi celebrates. Cf. WALZER, supra note 319, at 81 (“[T]he 
norm is not to intervene in other people’s countries; the norm is self-determination. But 
not for these people, the victims of tyranny, ideological zeal, ethnic hatred, who are not 
determining anything for themselves, who urgently need help from outside.”).  
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Without genocide, the broad shape of modern international law 
would look much the same. 
The Genocide Convention is, therefore, better seen as a 
start than an end. It enjoys chronological primacy in the 
postwar move away from absolutist sovereignty toward 
international legal protection of individuals. But it did not 
alone suffice to prevent genocide or even to punish it. The 
Convention has required numerous procedural elaborations—
including the ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal 
Court, the advancement of universal jurisdiction in customary 
law, the Responsibility to Protect, and the UN’s early warning 
system—just to make a start toward fulfilling the Convention’s 
promise “to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.”343 
Substantively, the international community has had to 
supplement genocide with other bounds on absolutist 
sovereignty. Modern international law treats genocide as a 
pivot between domestic and international, tolerable and 
intolerable, legal and illegal—but not as the pivot. All human 
rights law does the same.344 Nor does genocide stand alone in 
dividing the ordinary and extraordinary. For both international 
prosecution345 and justification for military humanitarian 
intervention,346 the line between domestic and international is 
not drawn at genocide, but at genocide-plus.347 
 
 343 Genocide Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. 
 344 See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 103, at 40 (“[A] key concern . . . [is] making 
human rights effective by limiting the atavistic conception of state sovereignty, 
subjecting it to an international human rights jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 345 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (listing the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court). 
 346 See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶¶ 4.19-4.20 (2001) [hereinafter R2P] (arguing that 
“military intervention for human protection purposes is justified . . . in order to halt or 
avert . . . large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not”); 
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 
16, 2005) (endorsing R2P); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶¶ 4, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 
2006) (same); see also African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) art. 8, para. 1, opened for 
signature Oct. 23, 2009 (not yet in effect), available at http://au.int/en/treaties (“The 
African Union shall have the right to intervene in a Member State . . . in respect of 
grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity . . . .”). 
 347 ICISS proposed to draw the intervention line at both genocide-plus and 
genocide-minus, omitting instances of Conventional genocide not threatening “large 
scale . . . loss of life.” R2P, supra note 346, ¶ 4.20. When the General Assembly and 
Security Council endorsed R2P, however, they did not adopt this limiting language, 
demonstrating the pull of genocide on the international community. See supra note 346. 
2012] LEMKIN’S SITUATION 613 
The meaning and use of genocide has always been 
criticized and contested. Many advocates simply deploy 
genocide as they themselves define it, often as something akin 
to extermination.348 Words are invented by individuals, but they 
are used by the community. Semantic contestation is normal, 
especially for ideographs and other politically important words.  
Still, it should be recognized that Lemkin’s rhetorical 
strategy might have contributed to public confusion of genocide 
with extermination. Lemkin repeatedly associated his word 
with Hitler’s “murder of millions.”349 He also linked it to 
Churchill’s “crime without a name” when Churchill had 
stressed the scale of Nazi murders.350 A degree of association 
between genocide and the Holocaust was inevitable—and 
perhaps even necessary for Lemkin’s word to succeed as it did. 
Nevertheless, Lemkin’s appeal to public revulsion against the 
Holocaust amplified aspects of the Holocaust more akin to 
extermination than to Lemkin’s own “ethnico-cultural 
concept[ion]” of genocide. Lemkin further obscured his own 
conception by incorporating into his writings, for a time, the 
General Assembly’s 1946 addition of “political groups” to the 
definition of genocide. Even Lemkin’s cultural arguments 
sometimes analogize genocide to murder in a way that appears 
to equate the two. For example, in the midst of a passage about 
culture, Lemkin writes, “The destruction of a 
nation . . . . offends our feelings of morality and justice in much 
the same way as does the criminal killing of a human being: 
the crime in the one case as in the other is murder, though on a 
vastly greater scale.”351 In all these respects, then, Lemkin 
allowed some tension between his conception of genocide and 
the rhetoric he used to promote it.  
Lemkin relied on etymology to anchor his word to his 
conception.352 Etymology, however, is much less weighty than 
Lemkin seems to have thought. Even where etymology 
correlates with a word’s first definition, it need not remain 
fixed there: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and 
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary 
 
 348 See supra notes 24-30, 327.  
 349 See supra Part IV.C.2.b. 
 350 See supra Part IV.C.2.a. 
 351 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3, at 91.  
 352 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and 
the time in which it is used.”353  
General critiques of etymology aside, Lemkin also 
misjudged his own etymology. Genos, despite its credentials in 
ancient Greek, is not strongly connected in modern English 
with race (or tribe, nation, or ethnicity, let alone religion). No 
English words begin with genos- and very few with geno-, none 
obviously sharing the sense of genos as race.354 English has 
many more gen- words, which derive mostly from genos, but 
they display a startling variety of meanings, obscuring their 
common root, which in any event is not the racial sense of 
genos.355 Simply put, there is no reason to believe that an 
educated English reader who saw Lemkin’s word for the first 
time could have drawn from knowledge of other gen- or geno- 
words to define it correctly.356 
By contrast, -cide words abound in English and they are 
firmly linked with killing. Homicide is more than six hundred 
years old.357 Fratricide, matricide, parricide, patricide, and 
regicide date to the sixteenth century, and deicide, infanticide, 
suicide, and tyrannicide to the seventeenth century.358 Farmers 
and hunters have given us such words as felicide, ovicide, 
tauricide, and vulpicide359—and even such “jocose nonce-words” 
 
 353 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (holding that the 
word “income” may have a different meaning in tax law than in the U.S. Constitution). 
For more on the lightness of etymology, see supra Part IV.C.1. 
 354 The OED lists the following words starting with geno-, plus some variants: 
Genoa, genosophis, genotype, genouillere, and a few words (several obsolete) relating to 
gene (genoblast, genologe, genome, genomere, and genonema). Three of these words have 
no discernible nexus to genos: Genoa, genosophis (a sect of ancient Hindu philosophers 
of ascetic habits), and genouillere (a flexible piece of armor to cover the knee, from the 
French for knee). The other words are traceable to genos, but in the sense of birth, 
offspring, or family—not race. See OED, supra note 270. 
 355 Examples in the OED, supra note 270, include: gender, general, generate, 
generic, genesis, genetic, genial, genie, genital, genius, genre, gentle, genuflect, genuine, 
and genus. Genie comes from the Arabic djinn and genuflect from the French for “to 
bend” and “knee.” The other examples may be traced to genos, but in the sense of birth, 
offspring, or family. Even this connection is sometimes obscure: gentle, for example, 
originally referred to noble birth, a sense that survives today mainly in gentlemen. Id. 
None of these examples offers any hint of genos as race. 
 356 Cf. Barrett, supra note 12, at 44-45 (quoting Sidney Alderman, a U.S. 
negotiator for the Nuremberg Indictment, “The British particularly thought [genocide] 
was too fancy a word to put in a legal document, and some of their graduates of Oxford 
University said that they couldn’t understand what the word meant.”). 
 357 See OED, supra note 270, at 332. 
 358 See I HISTORICAL THESAURUS OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 127, 128 
(Christian Kay et al. eds., 2009) (under “(n.) Killing of type of person”) (with updates for 
patricide and regicide available online at www.oed.com, last visited Feb. 1, 2012).  
 359 See id. (under “(n.) Killing of animals”). 
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as birdicide.360 Chemists have invented a variety of 
“preparations destructive of animal or vegetable life, [such] as 
algicide, fungicide, germicide, insecticide, pesticide.”361 The 
pattern is both clear and (chillingly) familiar: the word X-cide 
refers to killing X. In this circumstance, etymology may indeed 
help the educated reader understand an unfamiliar -cide word. 
If someone were to invent a new product called arachnocide, 
many readers would readily deduce its purpose. This points back 
to the trouble with genos. A reader unfamiliar with genocide 
might well think, “It means ‘killing geno,’ but what’s a geno?”362  
There is also a second difficulty arising from -cide itself. 
In every one of the -cide examples given here, the killing is 
literal.363 But Lemkin does not limit his idea of genocide to 
literal killing, “physical” killing in his typology. Genocide is not 
only coinage by analogy to existing words, but also coinage by 
metaphor; it is metaphorical death for a people, whether or not 
it involves physical death for any person.364 Introducing a novel 
metaphorical sense to a suffix with such a settled physical 
sense must be difficult under any circumstances, all the more 
so (again) given the obscurity of genos in modern English. 
VI. THE VALUE OF RHETORICAL SITUATION ANALYSIS  
A. Lemkin’s Rhetorical Situation and the Genocide 
Convention 
Bitzer’s rhetorical situation provides a lens to refract 
history, a means to see what Lemkin wished to achieve, the 
circumstances in which he acted, and the decisions he made. 
Bitzer thus lets us consider the cards Lemkin held to better 
appreciate how well he played his hand. 
 
 360 OED, supra note 270, at 213 (under -cide). 
 361 Id.  
 362 Even a reader familiar with genos and the many English words derived 
from its familial senses, supra notes 354-55, might reasonably infer that genocide 
means “killing a family” or “killing a relative”—an inference supported, sadly, by the 
many -cide words our language needs to describe the murder of relatives. 
 363 The only counterexamples I have been able to identify in common English 
are coincide and decide. The first is technically not a -cide word, because it derives from 
the prefix co- (with) and the Latin root incidare, meaning “to occur,” as in incident. 
Only decide suggests a metaphorical use of -cide, as it originates in the idea that “to 
decide” is “to cut off” deliberations. 
 364 Cf. LARRY MAY, GENOCIDE: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 84-90 (2010) (discussing 
Claudia Card’s argument that individuals who physically survive genocide suffer “social 
death,” but arguing that “social loss” or “social injury” are better metaphors).  
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The Bitzer lens also makes visible Lemkin’s core 
priorities. Lemkin’s views are not merely of historical interest; 
they have legal import. They contribute to the proper 
construction of the Genocide Convention.365 For one salient 
example, consider this passage, where the UN Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur applied (and implicitly construed) the intent 
requirement of Article II366: 
Some elements emerging from the facts including the scale of 
atrocities and the systematic nature of the attacks, killing, 
displacement and rape, as well as racially motivated statements 
by perpetrators that have targeted members of the African tribes 
only, could be indicative of the genocidal intent. However, there 
are other more indicative elements that show the lack of 
genocidal intent. The fact that in a number of villages attacked 
 
 365 The Genocide Convention should, of course, be construed in accordance 
with the applicable rules of international law, such as the customary rules codified in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, although the Vienna Convention itself does not apply retroactively 
to the Genocide Convention. See id. art. 4. I do not suggest here that Lemkin’s personal 
views should be given more weight than is consistent with international law—but, 
rather, that his work is relevant under the applicable principles of international law. 
For example, General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) provides: 
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as 
homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such 
denial . . . results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and 
other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to 
moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. 
G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13. This language, originally drafted by Lemkin and so 
resonant of his views, forms part of the “context” of the Convention as it is referenced 
in the Convention’s preamble. It also evidences both the Convention’s “object and 
purpose” and the existence of “relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations [among] the parties.” See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31; see also MARK E. 
VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
427-28 (2009) (“[T]eleological interpretation has traditionally played a part in the 
interpretation of . . . multilateral, ‘legislative’ conventions. The object and purpose also 
plays a particular part in the interpretation of human rights treaties.”). 
  Even apart from Resolution 96 (I), there may be particular issues where 
“[r]ecourse may be had” to Lemkin’s views as a “supplementary means of 
interpretation.” See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 32. First, the “preparatory work” of 
the Convention (even limiting that concept to formal UN documents) includes some 
contributions by Lemkin himself, as well as references to his views by other drafters 
and negotiators. Second, and perhaps most controversially, given Lemkin’s unique role 
in bringing about the Convention, his views form an important part of “the 
circumstances of its conclusion.” Id.; see also VILLIGER, supra, at 445 (“These 
[circumstances] include the political, social and cultural factors—the milieu—
surrounding the treaty’s conclusion.”); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 141 (2d ed. 1984) (Article 32 “emphasi[zes] the need for the 
interpreter to bear constantly in mind the historical background against which the 
treaty has been negotiated . . . .”). 
 366 See Genocide Convention, supra note 14, art. II (“[G]enocide means any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such . . . .”). 
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and burned by both militias and Government forces the attackers 
refrained from exterminating the whole population that had not 
fled, but instead selectively killed groups of young men, is an 
important element . . . .  
[T]he intent of the attackers was not to destroy an ethnic group 
as such . . . . Instead, the intention was to murder all those men 
they considered as rebels, as well as forcibly expel the whole 
population so as to vacate the villages and prevent rebels from 
hiding among, or getting support from, the local population. 
Another element that tends to show the Sudanese Government’s 
lack of genocidal intent can be seen in the fact that persons 
forcibly dislodged from their villages are collected in IDP camps. 
In other words, the populations surviving attacks on villages are 
not killed outright, so as to eradicate the group; they are rather 
forced to abandon their homes and live together in areas selected 
by the Government. . . . [T]he living conditions in those camps, 
although open to strong criticism on many grounds, do not seem 
to be calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic group 
to which the IDPs belong. . . .  
. . . . 
[O]ne inhabitant of the Jabir Village . . . . stated that he did not 
resist when the attackers took 200 camels from him, although 
they beat him up with the butt of their guns. . . . [H]is young 
brother, who possessed only one camel, had resisted when the 
attackers had tried to take his camel, and had been shot dead. 
Clearly, in this instance the special intent to kill a member of a 
group to destroy the group as such was lacking, the murder being 
only motivated by the desire to appropriate 
cattle . . . . Irrespective of the motive, had the attackers’ intent 
been to annihilate the group, they would not have spared one of 
the brothers. 
[O]ne crucial element appears to be missing, at least as far as the 
central Government authorities are concerned: genocidal intent. 
Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly 
displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific 
intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on 
racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would 
seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages 
pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, 
primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.367  
The Commission of Inquiry transformed the 
Convention’s intent requirement from “the intent to destroy [a 
protected group] as such” into something approaching “the 
 
 367 Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary-
General, ¶¶ 513-18 (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
618 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
intent to destroy [i.e., kill] every single member of the group.” 
This transformation is evident thrice: 
• First, in the argument that “had the attackers’ intent 
been to annihilate the group, they would not have spared one of 
the brothers,”368 the Commission uses annihilate in the sense of 
“reduce to non-existence, blot out of existence”—literally “to 
nothing.”369 The arguments that the “attackers refrained from 
exterminating the whole population”370 and that survivors “are 
not killed outright, so as to eradicate the group”371 reveal the 
same search for nothingness. 
• Second, in the argument that forced displacement into 
camps disproves the presence of genocidal intent as long as 
conditions in the camps are minimally adequate to sustain 
physical survival there, the Commission introduces a criterion 
irrelevant to the destruction of the group as a group (i.e., “as 
such”).372 The same is true of the argument that a government 
lacks genocidal intent when it aims to quash a rebellion 
through counter-insurgency warfare.  
• Most of all, the transformation is evident in what the 
Commission did not say. Wholly absent is any mention of the 
intent to prevent the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa from 
surviving as peoples (i.e., “as such”).  
The Commission’s approach cannot be squared with the 
ordinary meaning of the words “as such.” Schabas (who defends 
the Commission)373 concedes elsewhere that his reading of “as 
such” depends on the travaux préparatoires.374 Schabas 
contends that this phrase is meant, idiosyncratically, to import 
into the Convention a motive requirement specifying that a 
group must be destroyed “on the grounds of nationality, race, 
ethnicity, or religion.”375 In other words, for Schabas, killing 
every single member of a protected group is not enough to 
constitute genocide. Rather, all that killing must be done for a 
 
 368 Id. ¶ 517 (emphasis added). 
 369 OED, supra note 270, at 484. Annihilate derives from the Latin “ad to + 
nihil nothing.” Id. at 483-84. Annihilate also has the sense of “[t]o destroy the collective 
or organized existence of anything, by reducing it to its elements; to put an army to 
utter rout, etc.,” id. at 484, but the Commission is plainly not using this sense, because 
the survival of one soldier does not disprove the “utter rout” of an army. 
 370 Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 367, ¶ 513 (emphasis added). 
 371 Id. ¶ 518. 
 372 See id. 
 373 See William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur: 
The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703, 1705-06, 
1714-16 (2006). 
 374 SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 271. 
 375 Id. at 306.  
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particular motive. In Schabas’ view, destroying a group to seize 
their land or “for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare”376 is a 
crime against humanity, but not genocide.377 
Lemkin’s views inform this debate in several ways. 
First, he identifies the destruction of Carthage, for example, as 
genocide.378 He accepts Roman actions as enough to support 
this conclusion, without pausing to consider whether the 
Romans were motivated by ethnic (or national, racial, or 
religious) animus—or by the desire for farmland, to prevent a 
Fourth Punic War, or other political or military objectives. 
Second, let us turn to the Nazi invasion of Poland—the central 
experience of Lemkin’s life and the crucible in which he coined 
genocide.379 Germany invaded, at least in part, to gain 
Lebensraum.380 This goal did not preclude Lemkin from 
concluding that the Nazis had committed genocide against 
Slavs381—indeed, from pressing for genocide against Poles to be 
included in the Nuremberg indictment and judgment.382 This 
point is buttressed if we restate the facts in the Commission’s 
Darfur report in terms familiar to Lemkin: If Nazi Germany had 
invaded Poland, slaughtered thousands of Polish men, raped 
thousands of Polish women, burnt hundreds of Polish villages, 
beaten and robbed survivors, and forced the survivors into 
displacement camps where the living conditions were terrible 
but not so terrible as “to be calculated to bring about the 
extinction” of the people made to live there, the harm that so 
motivated Lemkin—the destruction of a group capable of 
making cultural contributions to the world, capable of producing 
“a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie”—would have come to pass.383 
The Nazis would have executed “a coordinated plan aimed at 
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of [a] national 
group[] so that [the] group[] wither[s] and die[s] like plants that 
 
 376 Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 367, ¶ 518. 
 377 See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 306 (“The crime must . . . be motivated by 
hatred of the group. The purpose of criminalizing genocide was to punish crimes of this 
nature, not crimes of collective murder prompted by other motives.”).  
 378 See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227; LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, 
supra note 3, at 80 n.3. 
 379 See generally LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 3; cf. Lemkin, AJIL, supra 
note 53, at 151 (“Germany’s practices actually provided the basis for developing the 
concept of genocide . . . .”).  
 380 See, e.g., A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR xxiv-xxvi, 
105-06 (2005 ed.) (discussing the extent to which Lebensraum moved Germany to war).  
 381 See, e.g., Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 227; Lemkin, War Against 
Genocide, supra note 181. 
 382 See supra note 157. 
 383 Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 176, at 228.  
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have suffered a blight.”384 The Nazis would have destroyed the 
Poles as a people, and they would have done so intentionally.  
Lemkin’s writings point to a better construction than 
that applied by the Commission and advocated by Schabas: the 
intent inquiry should ask whether the perpetrator intended to 
destroy a protected group as a group. This approach is truer to 
the ordinary meaning of the textual “as such.” It also treats 
respectfully the cultural concerns underpinning genocide when 
such concerns are made manifest by one of the actus rei listed 
in Article II, thus giving meaningful consideration to the idea 
animating the Convention.385  
B. Genocide and New Rhetorical Situations 
The Bitzer lens also helps us to focus on genocide’s 
continuing value to our public discourse, because Lemkin’s 
innovation remade the rhetorical situation for later advocates. 
Genocide figures especially prominently in contemporary 
discourse about humanitarian intervention. Love it or hate it, 
advocates and decision-makers in most public debates about 
humanitarian intervention must deal with genocide. It shapes 
their options and strategies, creating or helping some moves 
while hindering or even precluding others. It influences their 
audience, affecting which events are deemed worthy of 
attention by the media, policy-makers, and the public. It forces 
debate about whether particular events should be 
characterized as genocide, whether the Conventional definition 
should expand, whether genocide does or should trigger a right 
or duty of humanitarian intervention, and whether another 
trigger should supplement or replace genocide. On this last 
point, genocide’s hold on the language further acts as both 
resource and constraint for the neologists who coin words to 
advance their new concepts. Democide, ethnocide, gendercide, 
 
 384 Lemkin, Modern Crime, supra note 136.  
 385 Schabas objects to this approach on the ground that it would capture within 
genocide circumstances where “incidental” killings occur during implementation of a 
policy limited to acts (such as forced displacement) not listed in Article II. See SCHABAS, 
supra note 15, at 271. This objection does not speak to Darfur, however, where the 
murders, rapes, and other acts “[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm” cannot fairly be 
dismissed as “incidental.” Should an appropriate case arise, it would be open to the 
decision-maker to determine whether the “incidental” covered acts (perhaps even acts by 
one individual) are too remote from the policy aiming at group destruction by other 
means to warrant a finding of genocide in that particular case. In the meantime, I agree 
with Schabas that we should not be distracted by hypotheticals unlikely to impact policy 
or to be prosecuted by the ICC. See Schabas, supra note 373, at 1711. 
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humancide, humanicide, omnicide, and politicide all testify to 
the power of genocide in this field of discourse.386  
Ultimately, genocide’s role in shaping new rhetorical 
situations matters most today. To the extent genocide helps 
advocates of worthy actions to prevent and punish atrocities, it 
deserves its prominence in our language and our hierarchy of 
values. On the other hand, to the extent genocide helps 
advocates of unworthy actions or hinders advocates of worthy 
actions, it deserves to be redefined, reprioritized, or even retired.  
Genocide properly bounds sovereignty, because 
governments are instituted among us to secure our rights and 
safety,387 so no rule of law worthy of the name should enable 
governments to destroy groups of the very people they exist to 
serve.388 Sovereignty, like other governmental constructs, must 
yield to “elementary considerations of humanity.”389 These 
considerations are “intransgressible,”390 for humanity “is the 
raison d’etre of any legal system.”391 But genocide itself also must 
be tested against the needs of humanity. The priorities of 
international law, and the ideographs of international discourse, 
must be those that best serve humanity.392 This requires 
 
 386 See generally R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994) (regarding 
democide); C.C. Tennant & M.E. Turpel, A Case Study of Indigenous Peoples: Genocide, 
Ethnocide and Self-Determination, 59 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 287 (1990); MARY ANNE 
WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEX SELECTION (1985); Matthew Lippman, 
Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 183 
(1986); PIETER NICHOLAS DROST, 1 THE CRIME OF STATE: HUMANICIDE (1959); LISL J. 
MARBURG GOODMAN & LEE ANN HOFF, OMNICIDE: THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA (1990); 
Jordan Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and 
Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. J. INT’L L. 283 (1986).  
 387 Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 388 Cf. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 142, at 365-66 (arguing that “the 
Kantian fiduciary model [of sovereignty requires] an absolute prohibition” of genocide 
and other policies that “constitute a gross infringement of secure and equal freedom”). 
 389 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (holding that 
Albania had a duty under customary law to warn British ships crossing through the 
channel, and to notify international shipping generally, of the existence of a minefield 
in Albanian territorial waters).  
 390 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8). Strictly speaking, the Court’s statement addresses only certain 
“rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,” but only a slight extension 
reaches genocide and other norms “fundamental to the respect of the human person 
and ‘elementary considerations of humanity.’” Id. 
 391 Lillich, supra note 103, at 406; cf. Lemkin, Legal Case I, supra note 281, at 
205 (“International law should be an instrument for human progress and justice, not 
an obstacle to them.”). 
 392 I say this without prejudice to those circumstances where other considerations, 
such as animal welfare and environmental preservation, warrant our respect independent 
of their benefits for humanity, a subject beyond the scope of this Article. 
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continuous reexamination of genocide, as with other vital 
aspects of our discourse, laws, politics, priorities, and values.  
CONCLUSION 
“Some words are confined to their history; some are starting points 
for history.”–Felix Frankfurter.393  
Genocide is a starting point for history. Lemkin coined 
genocide to “build the law.”394 He succeeded quickly, with the 
Genocide Convention. This accomplishment cannot be 
dismissed as a mere “piece of paper,”395 a fading rose.396 It 
generated domestic criminal statutes, functioning international 
institutions, investigative teams, NGO watchdogs, political 
movements—even jail cells. People have been charged with, 
tried for, convicted of, and punished for genocide. This is law, 
however narrowly one defines it. 
Genocide also built customary international law. Beyond 
its own recognition as custom, genocide contributed to the 
development of some of the foundational principles of modern 
international law: peremptory norms (jus cogens) exist and 
they constrain states;397 states have responsibilities as well as 
rights, responsibilities owed to individuals, even to their own 
nationals,398 as well as to other states, perhaps even all other 
states (erga omnes); individuals, even high government 
officials, may be held accountable for gross offenses in court 
(domestic, foreign, international, or mixed).399 Genocide also 
helped to modernize other aspects of custom: expanding 
universal jurisdiction beyond traditional crimes like piracy, for 
 
 393 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. 
L. REV. 527, 537 (1947). 
 394 See Rosenthal, supra note 1. 
 395 Id. 
 396 Charles de Gaulle is said to have said that treaties “are like roses and 
young girls; they last while they last.” See Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of 
Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 304 (1977). 
 397 See HENKIN, supra note 102, at 39 n.*, 176-77 (crediting the Genocide 
Convention with “helping to launch the concept of jus cogens,” a concept that 
“derogates pro tanto from state autonomy and the principle of consent”). 
 398 Id. at 176-77 (“Subordinating state values to human values, [the Genocide 
Convention] established that, in principle and in one respect at least, how a state treated 
its own inhabitants was a legitimate, appropriate subject of international law.”). 
 399 Cf. JESSUP, supra note 134, at 2 (describing the “keystones of a revised 
international legal order”). 
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example, and updating the law of treaty reservations for the 
age of major multilateral conventions.400  
Genocide, moreover, built law in James Boyd White’s 
deeper sense of law as language and community. It changed 
the conversation among states. It provides states a new “range 
of things to say to each other.”401 It empowers states with “a set 
of things they may say”402 to object to (certain) atrocities 
occurring in another state. The UN instruments enable states 
to say that genocide is “a matter of international concern,” “a 
crime under international law,” and an “odious scourge”—and 
that it is “contrary to the spirit and aims of the United 
Nations,” it “has inflicted great losses on humanity,” and it 
must be combated with “international cooperation.”403 This 
language simultaneously inhibits a state accused of genocide 
“from saying other things.”404 It cannot say, “Genocide is good” 
or even “Genocide is bad, but outweighed by other priorities.” 
And it cannot say, “Mind your own business” or “Pay no 
attention to the men suffering behind the curtain.” Genocide 
deprives an accused state of the absolute sovereignty defense. 
The state is obliged instead to deny the factual allegations or 
their legal characterization as genocide. It has to converse 
about genocide, engaging in a discourse structured by the 
Genocide Convention. Genocide thus facilitates interstate 
conversations on subjects that previously had been difficult to 
raise and easy to dismiss. By changing the conversation in this 
way, genocide reconstituted the community of nations: it moved 
the community from one devoted (almost) exclusively to 
interstate relations to one concerned as well with (certain of) a 
nation’s own internal acts. The new community became 
transnational, rather than international, in nature. 
For all its historic significance, it must be acknowledged 
that genocide stands accused of making history in another sense 
as well. The charge is that genocide enables mass atrocities 
(including genocide itself) by interfering with effective efforts to 
 
 400 See Vienna Convention, supra note 365, arts. 19-23 (following the ICJ’s 
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention).  
 401 WHITE, supra note 2, at xi. 
 402 Id. at 95-96 (“The law is literally and deliberately constitutive: it creates 
roles and relations, places and occasions on which one may speak; it gives to the 
parties a set of things that they may say, and prohibits them from saying other things; 
it makes a real social world.”). 
 403 See G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 13; Genocide Convention, supra note 14, 
pmbl., art. I.  
 404 WHITE, supra note 2, at 95-96. 
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stop them.405 To the extent this is true, genocide must yield to 
new definitions, new priorities, or new terms. It might be 
changed, supplemented, or replaced altogether—that is, it might 
be “confined to [its] history.” The Bitzer prism applied here can 
contribute to that assessment of genocide’s future by making 
visible genocide’s impact on the rhetorical situation of advocates 
for worthy actions against atrocity. 
 
 405 See supra Part V.B. 
